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Abstract  
This thesis targets the Swedish labour immigration law for third-country nationals (TCNs): 
persons coming from outside the EU, ESS, and Switzerland. The reform, implemented in 2008, 
aims to positively influence circular migration. This study sets out to analyze strengths and flaws 
of the new system, through investigating the perception of actors in contact with the current legal 
labour migrant situation. The study is based on qualitative interviews with seven actors in 
contact with labour migration, as well as document analysis on debate articles selected from 
Swedish newspapers. The theoretical framework, consisting of closure theory and the concepts 
of exploitation and commodification, is operationalized by analysing the policy from the starting 
point of the vulnerable situation migrant workers might experience in a host country. When 
linking the discourse of the various actors to the analytical framework, the findings of the study 
indicate that the Swedish labour immigration law for TCNs is including to the extent that there 
now is an easy way to legally enter Sweden to work, but excluding features in the form of 
various restrictions are also incorporated in the legal framework. Irresponsible employers
1
, 
exploiting migrant workers, are an existing complex problem. Still, it is unclear to what extent 
the legal framework is responsible for that. The findings show a lack of comprehensive 
information for migrant workers on the legal framework. This, in combination with the visa 
status, may lead to extra-exploitation on the Swedish labour market. Irresponsible employers 
may both exploit and commodify migrant workers in various ways. However, the legal 
framework with its restrictions directed towards TCNs is designed for migrant workers to not 
enjoy free movement on the labour market. Thus, it is possible that they are, due to state 
regulations, not commodified enough.  
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 Employers exploiting migrant workers are in the Swedish debate called 'oseriösa', which will be translated 
to 'irresponsible employers' throughout this thesis.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In this thesis I will examine the Swedish labour immigration law for third-country 
nationals, TCNs, persons coming from outside the EU, ESS, and Switzerland. The 
legal framework changed in 2008, with the intention to positively influence circular 
migration, provide the Swedish labour market with the skills needed, target 
demographic challenges and benefit migrant workers. The purpose of the study is to 
give an indication of possible consequential tendencies of the new legal framework. 
This section will provide an introduction to the field of the thesis including, in the 
following order, background, previous research, purpose of study, research question 
and limitations. 
1.1. Background 
Labour migration has become a global issue with significant ramifications, affecting 
an increasing number of nations worldwide (ILO, 2006), additionally “the regulation 
of labour immigration is one of the most important and controversial public policy 
issues in high-income countries” (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010: 1). Both labour 
migration in general (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010) and seasonal labour migration trends 
are growing internationally (Reilly, 2011), which, according to Attas (2000: 73) has 
become a “permanent phenomenon for the relationship between developed and 
developing countries”. Even though the migrant worker flows include both low-
skilled and highly skilled workers and there has been an increase in the latter, still, 
low-skilled workers dominate the migrant workforce (ILO, 2006). According to the 
International Labour Organisation, ILO, both the host countries and the countries of 
origin may benefit from the migrant workers contribution to development in addition 
to their remittances (ILO, 2006).  
     While the definition of a guest worker has been conflated with everything from 
foreign workers to “our maids” (Hahamovitch, 2003: 70), what they have in common 
is temporary authorized work across borders. “Guest worker”, which comes from the 
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German word Gastarbeiter, implies that these workers are not illegally staying in the 
country but are guests, desired to eventually leave (Hahamovitch, 2003). The idea 
behind guest worker programs is the notion that migrant workers will return to their 
country of origin after their temporary work contract expires (Bauböck, 2011). The 
guest worker schemes are often justified by the argument that it is ultimately a 
beneficial situation for all parties involved: 
 
The migrant labourer has access to new employment opportunities, the 
chance for higher paid work than is available at home and the 
attainment of new skills. The [Australian] employer has access to an 
increased pool of labour to supplement the domestic labour market. 
Sending states potentially benefit from remittances, which are of major 
significance in [Pacific Island] economies and they potentially benefit 
from the increased skill set of the labourers if they return home. 
Receiving states benefit economically from the influx of a secure and 
potentially cheap source of labour (Reilly, 2011: 131) 
 
     In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries comprehensive state regulations were 
imposed on migration. The building of welfare states, bringing with them more 
services to their citizens, gave rise to incentives to define who was qualified for these 
services. Crossing borders became more difficult, and even in some cases 
criminalized. It was under these circumstances that temporary worker programs were 
born, and today they are still in practice, often said to be a strategy to discourage 
illegal immigration (Hahamovitch, 2003). However, some scholars claim the 
opposite, that the programs have indeed increased illegal immigration. According to 
Hahamovitch (2003) these programs have been a complete failure when it comes to 
making immigration temporary, but a success to supply labour for rich countries 
relying on migrant workers performing hard work their own citizens are not inclined 
to do. Castles (2006) points out that within Europe, there was a demand for low-
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skilled guest workers from 1945 to 1970, and the labour migration policies were 
designed for the purpose filling that demand. During the 1990s national immigration 
restrictions were put into use. However, due to various factors including globalization 
and demographic changes, these restrictions have started to loosen. Today, the desired 
target group is the highly skilled migrant workers (Castles, 2006). Highly skilled 
migrant workers hold a degree, from college or university, or have the corresponding 
work experience (Asiedu, 2010). Policies are designed to welcome highly skilled 
migrant workers, but to restrict entry for less skilled workers (Castles, 2006). Shachar 
(2006) calls this phenomenon “competitive immigration regimes” (Shachar, 2006: 
153) and “the race for talent” (Shachar, 2006: 155), a strategy to “retain or gain an 
advantage in the new global economy” (Shachar, 2006: 148). Highly skilled migrant 
workers can also be referred to as “reflect a transnational elite” (Kiwan, 2010: 339). 
     Due to the topic's importance, there have been wide debates on policy making, 
including how to “link the admission of migrant workers to the 'needs' of the 
domestic labour market and the national economy more generally” (Anderson and 
Ruhs, 2010: 2). According to Anderson and Ruhs (2010), two contrasting discourses 
can be distinguished. First, one discourse arguing that migrant labour can fill labour 
and skill shortages. This is connected to support of economic growth and 
competitiveness, via admission of highly skilled migrant workers and human capital. 
The second discourse says that employers only are looking for cheap and exploitable 
labour. ILO points out that it is often the low-skilled workers who suffer from abuse 
(ILO, 2006). 
     In 2008 Sweden changed its labour migration law for TCNs (see section 1.1.2.). 
There has been a shift to an employer-driven policy, and the policy framework does 
not discern between low-skilled and highly skilled labour immigration. Berg and 
Spehar (2013) point out that the emphasis on immigration in the Swedish political 
debate has gone from a social and human rights focus to an economic problem 
solving focus on how labour migration as such can contribute to the Swedish 
economy, such as business demands and demographic challenges. Commissioned by 
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the Swedish government, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, OECD, evaluated the Swedish migrant labour reform. The evaluation 
resulted in the report “Recruiting Immigrant Workers, Sweden”, issued in December 
2011. According to the report, Sweden currently has the most open migrant labour 
framework among the OECD countries. However, one weakness of the legal 
framework is the lack of supervision of the promised labour conditions. Berg and 
Spehar (2013) mention exploitation of foreign labour and call attention to the 
importance to investigate the consequences of the 2008 policy changes. For example 
it is needed to further explore the “conditions, rights and citizenship rules for 
migrants” (Berg and Spehar, 2013: 157).  
1.1.1. Terminology 
There are various terms connected to migrant workers. This section sketches an 
outline of a few of the common definitions. First, there is the difference between a 
migrant worker and a seasonal worker. The United Nations, in its International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families, define a migrant worker as “a person who is to be engaged, is 
engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is 
not a national” (UN, 1990a), and a seasonal worker as “a migrant worker whose work 
by its character is dependent on seasonal conditions and is performed only during part 
of the year” (UN, 1990b). The ILO (1949), in the Migration for Employment 
Convention defines the term ‘migrant for employment’ as “a person who migrates 
from one country to another with a view to being employed otherwise than on his 
own account and includes any person regularly admitted as a migrant for 
employment”. Further, Attas (2000:73) defines the term ‘guest workers’ as: 
 
an intermediate category of foreign workers somewhere along the line 
between an illegal immigrant at one end and a permanent settler, a 
resident in the process of naturalisation, at the other. The guest, or 
contract, worker is a legally residing non-national, working under 
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permit of various restrictions, particularly attachment to a specific 
project, employer, sector or industry, type of occupation and/or 
duration of stay. 
 
In sum, guest workers are defined commonly as temporary work migrants (Oke 2012; 
Hahamovitch 2003). According to Walzer, the guest worker is more of a worker than 
a guest or tourist. They are in the host-country on the basis to work (Attas, 2006). 
Castles (2006) speaks of recruitment of foreign workers, migrant workers, and guest 
workers, but uses the words interchangeably. What the terms have in common is a 
person working in a country of which s/he is not a national, and the job position is 
temporary.    
     This thesis, when applied to the case of Sweden, will speak of labour migrants and 
labour migration referring to TCN, coming to Sweden to work, short term or long 
term, on a work permit including restrictions of various kinds. However, when 
analysing previous research, the terminology used by the various authors will be 
applied. 
1.1.2. Swedish legal framework 
The legal framework concerning labour immigration for TCNs is long and complex, 
and the following description refers to what is most relevant for this study
2
. In 2008, 
the Swedish Government, in agreement with the Swedish Green Party, changed the 
labour immigration law for TCNs, with the goal to increase the positive effects of 
circular migration to and from Sweden. The old authority based labour market trial 
ceased. Instead, the new legal framework is employer demand oriented, implicating 
that the employer best knows the current recruitment needs. Reasons behind the 
change of the legal framework were demographic challenges, revitalise the labour 
market, and an existing mismatch between labour demand and supply. Labour 
shortages and unemployment may occur concurrently. Moreover, it would make it 
easier for legal employment in Sweden and thus decrease work in the black market 
                                                          
2
 See bill 2007/08:147 for full information  
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where employees tend to be most vulnerable. The reform is supposed to have a 
positive effect; to provide the Swedish labour market with workers and to enrich the 
migrants’ countries of origin with new knowledge and experience (prop. 
2007/08:147). 
     Under this framework the Migration Board, instead of the Swedish Employment 
Agency as before the reform, checks that the employment exists and that the 
standards, according to Swedish collective agreements, are followed. To avoid 
irresponsible employers and the driving down of wages, the requirements for work 
conditions of migrant labour are the same as for the domestic workforce. If the work 
conditions do not fulfil the requirements, the Migration Board will deny the work 
permit application. Also, the unions shall look over the work conditions. Included in 
the application screening process is an inspection of the work place through 
affirmation that the work conditions can be maintained. Once the employee is in 
Sweden, it is the police, Swedish Tax Agency, the Work Environment Authority, 
WEA, and the unions who are responsible to oversee if the contracts
3
 are being 
respected. If the contract is not respected, both employer and employee risk 
punishment of six months in prison or a fine. When and if an extension of the stay is 
applied for, the Migration board checks again if the conditions were fulfilled (prop. 
2007/08:147).  
     The time frames for the work permit have been pro-longed. Initially the work 
permit is connected to only one work section and employer. Subsequently after the 
first two years, the permit can be prolonged for another two years, but then the permit 
is only connected to one work section. A permanent residence permit can be issued 
after four years of residence in Sweden (prop. 2007/08:147). 
     A trial period of three months if being un-employed has been put into practice. The 
employee does not automatically lose the residence permit if fired or decides to leave 
the employment; instead there is a three month trial period when s/he can look for a 
new job. The idea behind this rule is to decrease the dependency on the employer. But 
                                                          
3
 See 1.1.3. for the basics of a contract 
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the residence permit ceases to be valid if the worker has not found new employment 
within three months (prop. 2007/08:147). 
     Employees may bring their family with them. The family members allowed to 
accompany an employee include: the spouse, common-law spouse, or registered 
partner, unmarried children of the employee or partner. If the children are over the 
age of 21, they need to be financially depended on the employee or the employee’s 
partner to come with. If the family is allowed to accompany the employee, they get a 
permit for the same period of time as the employee (Migration Board). 
     After twelve months of work and stay in Sweden a person can be nationally 
registered and then inherent, almost, the same rights and obligations as national 
citizens (prop. 2007/08:147).  
1.1.3. Job application process 
On their website, the Swedish Migration Board informs TCNs, about the application 
procedure for a Swedish work permit. First, it is necessary to have a work offer, and 
the work permit needs to be ready before moving to Sweden. The potential employee 
needs to hold a valid passport, has been offered work with work conditions equal to 
Swedish collective wage agreements or what is customary within that specific area of 
work, and been offered to earn at least 13 000 SEK per month before taxes. For some 
work areas, such as cleaning, hotel jobs, construction work, agriculture, service jobs, 
etc., different rules apply. The control mechanism for the employer has been 
tightened up to approve a work permit application. The employer needs to be 
accountable for how to pay the employee's salary, and also provide the Migration 
Board with a tax bank statement for the last three months. The employer needs to 
offer a work proposal including information on insurance, time for the employment 
and the salary offered. If getting a work permit valid for longer than three months, the 
employee will also get a residence permit card. Second, the relevant union needs to 
comment on the offer. And finally, the employment offer and comments from the 
union will be sent by the employer to the employee. The work permit is valid for 
working with the employer and occupation mentioned in the application for the first 
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24 months. If the employee/worker finds a new job, a new permit will have to be 
issued. After the 24 months, the employee may switch employer without issuing a 
new work permit. However, the employee still needs to work within the same 
occupation. The offer of employment is, however, not a legally binding work 
contract, and instead a real work contract will be issued once the employee has 
arrived in Sweden. There is a work application fee of 2,000 SEK. Additional fees may 
be added, in cases of extension of the permit, permits for family members, or fees for 
particular occupations. 
1.1.4. The Swedish social insurance system for TCNs 
The regulations for the Swedish social insurance system are to be found in 
Socialförsäkringsbalken (2010:110). Also, since Sweden has signed conventions with 
various countries regarding social insurance there may be regulations to be found for 
respective country. Each convention looks different depending on the agreement 
between Sweden and that specific country (SKV 405).  
     The SNIA administers and verifies social insurance entitlements: there are 
employment-based and residence-based entitlements. An employee taking part in the 
Swedish labour market is covered by the Swedish social insurance system since the 
employer pays social security contributions (SKV 345B). The employment-based 
insurance ceases to be valid three months after the employment ends. However, the 
time limit may be subjected to change; it can both be longer and shorter (FK 
4068_Fa). Thus, when working in Sweden an employee is entitled to employment-
based social benefits (sickness benefits, parents’ allowance, pension and occupational 
injuries benefits). Still, to be covered by the social insurance system, Sweden should 
be the primary place of work. The SNIA decides if this is the case (SKV 345B). Also, 
each benefit has its own requirements that have to be fulfilled (FK 4068_Fa). 
     If coming to Sweden for work purposes only there is no constraint to register at 
the SNIA. To apply for employment-based entitlements one does not have to be 
nationally registered. Yet, if wanting to apply for employment-based entitlements one 
has to contact the SNIA for an evaluation of the situation (FK 4068_Fa). If residing in 
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Sweden for a period of one year or longer one should register oneself at the Swedish 
Tax Agency (SKV 703-5B). If working with a work permit issued for less than one 
year, and therefore not being nationally registered, an employee is not entitled to 
health care compensation and should therefore provide a private health insurance 
from the country of origin (SKV 345B). 
1.2. Problem area 
This section will present a brief overview of previous research conducted in relation 
to migrant workers, focusing on migrant workers coming from developing countries 
to the western countries. This is of more relevance for this study than focus on certain 
other migrant worker flows, such as highly skilled migrant workers from developed 
countries employed in the USA, Canada etc. The previous research section is 
categorized according to three themes: citizenship, vulnerability and exploitation, 
which were found as the main threads throughout the various articles. Sometimes the 
categories overlapped within previous research. If so, a judgment has been made 
where to best fit the research. Due to the currently absence of academic research on 
these three themes in relation to the new Swedish regulatory framework, there will 
not be references made to migrant workers in Sweden within the three sub-sections 
this section. The selected articles refer in general to migrant workers from developing 
countries, but also make references to specific contexts such as the United States, 
Canada, Mexico, Australia, and the Pacific. The aim of this section is to provide a 
short overview of how the migrant workers situation looks in general. It is difficult to 
indicate to what extant its relevance is for migrant workers coming to Sweden.   
1.2.1. Citizenship 
Walzer argues that guest workers are hired for positions that the host nation's citizens 
do not want, or find unpleasant, and therefore create a situation which he describes as 
“a family with live-in servants” (Reilly, 2011: 136). Attas (2000: 83) outlines the 
guest worker's general situation as follows:  
 
Guest workers contribute in various ways to the well-being of the host 
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society. They participate in the co-operative productive process, 
creating goods and services that cater for various needs and tastes; as 
consumers they contribute to the creation of more jobs; they pay taxes 
which are spent on vital social institutions and economic 
infrastructure; they have an enriching cultural influence on their 
surroundings. Yet they are deprived of the chance politically to 
participate in the design and shaping of the social environment in 
which they live, work and contribute, as well as being denied many of 
the advantages of membership. 
 
Migrant workers actually often are prepared to accept lower work conditions in 
exchange for a higher salary than in their country of origin (Reilly, 2011). This should 
not justify poorer working conditions for migrant guest workers willing to take on 
jobs rejected by the nation’s citizens especially since they often receive 
comparatively low wages and are regarded to have a lower status (Mayer, 2005). 
Walzer claims that the readiness to take on these jobs comes from the “difference in 
power and opportunity associated with different citizenships” (Reilly, 2011:136). If 
guest workers were granted improved working conditions, they would, as the national 
citizens, not take on the jobs (Reilly, 2011).  
     The status of a non-citizen depends greatly between different national contexts, 
and between groups. Gibney (2009) distinguishes between two groups of non-
citizens; highly skilled migrants and guest workers (which he places side by side with 
asylum seekers and undocumented migrants). The first group might enjoy various 
political and social rights, sometimes even the right to vote in local elections. The 
access to these rights facilitates integration. Gibney calls the second group 
“precarious residents” (Gibney, 2009:2) as they lack voice and security, and therefore, 
are excluded “from two of the benefits of citizenship” (Reilly, 2011: 146). This lack 
of voice means not having a political voice to influence public discussions on 
government policy and cannot participate in the creation of policies concerning their 
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own situation and the regulatory framework. Bauböck (2011) outlines a similar 
argument, saying that temporary migrants are only partial citizens since they do not 
enjoy all employment benefits and social rights, and also they do not enjoy the 
possibility of political participation or representation. Security is also a matter of 
importance within this discourse as Gibney defines secure as “freedom from the risk 
of deportation” (Reilly, 2011: 147). The migrant worker would not only lose the 
employment but also risk deportation if fired (Reilly, 2011). Gibney states that when 
holding a secure residence status, one’s rights are more reachable (Reilly, 2011). 
Kiwan (2010) also writes about the difference in conditions between highly skilled 
migrant workers and low-skilled workers. The former often enjoy “more attractive 
conditions with respect to settlement, naturalisation and integration” (Kiwan, 2010: 
335) due to the competition for their skills, but they may suffer from exclusion and 
discrimination on the labour market due to “their actual or perceived color, religion or 
origin” (Syed, 2008: 30).   
     Guest workers are exposed to various restrictions that other workers are not, for 
example, the duration of stay and restriction to a particular for example sector, 
industry or employer. The restrictions are legitimized on a basis of nationality of the 
worker (Attas, 2000). Therefore the guest workers cannot “compete freely” (Mayer, 
2005: 315) in the host labour market. Freedom of occupation is not respected, and 
Mayer (2005) reasons that exploitation could be avoided if guest workers were not 
restricted in this way, but instead were free to apply for whatever job they desired and 
thus could compete on the labour market with the other workers.   
1.2.2. Vulnerability 
Seasonal labour migration is often said to be connected to a relationship between the 
employer and the employee, characterized by vulnerability for the latter. The guest 
worker is vulnerable due to the status as non-citizens of the society, and also due to 
the power of inequality with the employer (Reilly, 2011). However, Reilly (2011) 
does not discuss how this power imbalance differs from the usual power relationship 
between employers and employees. Mexican migrant workers in Canada are 
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frequently deprived of at least some of their rights, and this often depends for 
example on their lack of support and knowledge of the legal framework, and poor 
communications skills (Basok, 2004). Highly skilled migrant workers might not be as 
vulnerable as low-skilled workers, since the latter often have more at risk due to 
difference in visa status. However, the legal framework must be taken into 
consideration when assessing and analysing the bargaining position of the workers 
(Oke, 2012). 
     Even if the guest worker is free to return to the country of origin at any time, this 
might be difficult in reality due to the migrant worker has often invested a lot when 
taking a job abroad. With that much invested in migrating due to an employment it 
might not, in practice, be easy to leave the position. Thus, the workers find 
themselves in a vulnerable position. According to Phillip, “there is a further 
obligation on government to ensure that the migrant worker is not subject to the 
possibility of domination” (Reilly, 2011:143). Many scholars argue that there is a lack 
of bargaining power as well as voice for temporary migrant workers. The guest 
worker is often tied to a certain employer which binds the worker to a vulnerable 
situation. The workers will have to stand the employer for better or for worse, if they 
want to keep their legal standing, continue making a living, or at least cover the 
expenses for having travelled to the host country (Attas, 2000). Attas (2000:89) even 
calls this the resemblance of “a master and slave relationship”.  
     Smith (2007) describes the situation for the guest workers, in the United States, as 
characterized by high precarious and vulnerability since the guest worker cannot 
change job and frequently is indebted due to an economical investment in getting the 
job. Smith (2007) also points out that the worker might be deprived of the right salary 
because of lack of oversight. White (2007), as well speaking of the United States, 
points out that workers have been deprived of their salaries and exposed to abuse due 
to lack of supervision of the regulations. Smith (2007:73) even uses the term 
“bondage like system” when describing the migrant worker's situation. Often the 
guest workers want to work as much as possible so that they can ”return home as 
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quickly as possible” (Reilly, 2011: 133), and they also accept bad working conditions 
for the restricted period of time working abroad as long as this benefits the possibility 
of improved living standards when going back to the country of origin (Bauböck, 
2011). However, Bauböck (2011: 667) argues that this cannot be seen as a reason for 
exploiting their labour, but instead ”they must be clearly included when assessing a 
system of rights by a criterion of social justice, such as Rawls’ difference principle 
that considers how the system affects the worst off group”. 
     Pajnik (2012) outlines a comparative perspective of TCNs coming to six EU 
member states, Cyprus; Finland; Germany; Hungary; Italy and Slovenia, to work. The 
migrants are often living under precarious economic conditions; “high level of job 
insecurity, low payment and a low level of social benefits, and where they face de-
skilling, language barriers, and discrimination of the workplace” (Pajnik, 2012: 152). 
These conditions contribute to that the European countries, may they vary in 
requirements for entry and stay, “produce 'conditioned lives'” (Pajnik, 2012: 153) for 
TCNs meaning “forced flexibilization of migrants that serves the needs of global 
capital” (Pajnik, 2012: 154) through an un-stable labour market and work relations, as 
well as legal status. Pajnik (2012) discovered that many migrant workers had a forced 
relationship to their employer, due to the lack of knowledge about their rights as well 
as the migrants’ vulnerable status. The employer took advantage of this. 
1.2.3. Exploitation 
The guest workers are often recruited to work in so called 3D jobs: dirty, dangerous 
and/or demanding (Attas, 2000). The wage received, for these jobs, will be higher 
than in their country of origin and instead of the possibility of being unemployed they 
will have a job. The salary will probably be lower than what the domestic workers 
consider enough, since they do not take the jobs (Attas, 2000). However, Attas (2000) 
contests if [highly skilled] guest workers are really to be considered lacking 
something. The option would be to stay in the country of origin and make a living 
there. Attas (2000) raises two questions to consider in the relation between guest 
workers and exploitation: whether the guest worker receives a just wage and whether 
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the guest worker is forced to take on the job. 
     Walia (2010: 71) defines temporary migrant workers as a “disposable workforce”, 
and thus “perfect workforce” (Walia, 2010: 72), highly exposed to exploitation in the 
Canadian labour market, due to their lack of being able to demand their rights thus 
becoming “commodified and exploitable; flexible and expendable” (Walia, 2010: 72). 
Walia (2010) writes that demanding rights in the Canadian context lead to, because of 
the vulnerability connected to the temporary legal status, deportation. Castles argues 
that the potential host-countries look for “labour, not people” (Reilly, 2011:145). 
Garcia (2006:28) even holds that there should be a “democratic deficit”, lack of 
democratic accountability, due to the workers being treated like commodities and 
lacking bargaining power. It is argued that the migrant worker is exploited as cheap 
labour due to the uneven bargaining power (Reilly, 2011). Somerville and Walsworth 
(2009) draw attention to the increased risk of exploitation when the work permission 
is based on the employment with a specific employer. This might also affect highly 
skilled migrant workers, and “it is probable that they suffer from some degree of 
exploitation” (Somerville and Walsworth, 2009: 156). 
     The threat of being deported, from Canada, creates a group of a exploitable 
employees whom the employer can fire without consequences (Walia, 2010). This 
can influence immigration statuses, result in the increase of power inequality, which 
can in turn be used as a control mechanism (White, 2007). Garcia (2006), focusing on 
the United States, argues that guest workers fit perfectly in the neoliberal paradigm, 
that is based on the idea that anything can freely bought and sold; “guestworkers are 
commodified because they are treated as articles of trade without bargaining power or 
voice in the substantive transaction” (Garcia, 2006: 28). Even so, Garcia (2006: 36) 
goes on to say that “based on the apparent need for guest workers to fill jobs within 
this country [USA], temporary workers would seem to have a great deal of bargaining 
power”.  
     Guest workers may be legally enjoying full employment protection under national 
regulatory frameworks, but the awareness of the specific legal rights and on how to 
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defend them is most likely small. Even though they would be aware of their rights 
they could be too scared to stand up for them, due to consequences from the 
employer's side (White, 2007). White (2007) would want to see the control 
mechanism developed, used and working to avoid generating two distinct classes of 
employees; migrant workers as being considered second class and thus easier to 
exploit. Also, White (2007) argues that the guest worker program, in the United 
States, needs discrimination protection and the inherent possibility for workers to 
present legal claims and rights.   
     The concept that competition between guest workers and the domestic workforce 
would weaken labour standards and lower wages for all workers has distressed labour 
unions (White, 2007), and Smith (2007: 72) holds that ”historical studies show that 
unrestricted access to guest workers has the potential to dilute labor standards for all 
workers”. Smith (2007) discusses how to protect the local workers when hiring other 
workers and also how to “serve business’s need for workers, but control its desire for 
cheap labor” (Smith, 2007: 70); the issue arises of how to stabilize labour rights 
versus the business world.  
     Pajnik (2012) concludes that TCNs coming to Europe to work are often hired for 
low-skilled labour that the domestic workers do not wish to take on, the 3D jobs, 
”where exploitation of workers is not uncommon” (Pajnik, 2012: 153). They are not 
able to freely move on the labour market since the work permit is connected to a 
certain employment. Pajnik (2012) suggests that the labour market in the EU is  
segmented and migrants are offered the low-skilled works. The policy frameworks 
make it difficult to change occupation. Also, the migrant workers' various rights are 
connected to the permit. TCNs are often exposed to inequalities and bad working 
conditions.  
1.3. Purpose of study 
As we can see from the previous sections, widespread abuse of migrant workers is 
not uncommon, which can lead us to question if abuse has also infiltrated the 
Swedish labour market, and if so, how? The legal framework changed a few years 
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ago, and it is of the utmost importance to investigate the strengths but also the flaws 
of the new system. Even more important is to examine the conditions for the migrant 
worker due to the vulnerable situation many migrant workers may experience. It is 
therefore crucial to investigate the practical side of the regulatory framework for 
migrant workers in Sweden. 
     This study is interested in the welfare of TCNs coming to work in Sweden, how 
various actors in contact with labour migration perceive the changes in the legal 
framework and how the framework has influenced the conditions for TCNs migrant 
workers. The purpose of the study is not to generalize the findings, but instead to give 
an indication of possible consequential tendencies of the new legal framework.  
1.3.1. Research question 
How can the Swedish legal framework for labour immigration regarding TCNs be 
understood from the perspective of actors in contact with labour migration?  
1.4. Limitations  
As was stated above, there has been little academic research conducted to follow up 
on the 2008 changes of the Swedish labour migration management policy. Due to 
time and budget limitations, it is not intended for this study to be all-encompassing. 
Instead, it sets out to give an indication of what is highly important to further 
investigate in the topic. It is not within the scope of this study to show the reality of 
migrant workers from their own perspectives, since the study has not had the 
opportunity to access migrant workers, due to time and resource limitations. The 
decision was made to not include undocumented migrants, but only those coming to 
work having obtained a Swedish work permit since the purpose is to investigate the 
changes of the legal framework.  
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2. Theoretical framework  
 
This section will present a theoretical discussion of three theories focusing on 
relations in the labour market between employees and employers. The theories are 
closure theory, exploitation and (re)commodification. Following this, the analytical 
framework for the study will be presented.  
2.1 Exclusion and exploitation  
2.1.1. Closure theory 
Closure theory originates from Max Weber, who focuses part of his research on “the 
different forms exclusion takes at the level of the distribution of social wealth and in 
non-economic social fields” (Koch, 2006: 9). According to Murphy (1983: 643) 
closure theorists focusing on analyses of property, such as Parkin, are “heavily 
indebted to Marx” for some of their ideas, but many claim that the Marxist theory is 
incomplete for studying social closure in today's society. Marxist theory and closure 
theory are not in disagreement; Murphy (1983) says they overlap, even if there is 
disagreement between theorists. Both have in common that property as capital plays a 
significant role. However, for Marx the class struggle was irresolvable, but for the 
Weberian tradition it is manageable (Murphy, 1983). Also, closure theory uses double 
enlargement, meaning that it focuses on two things: what a person/group is excluded 
from, and of what the monopolization is. Closure theory widens the focus from only 
one aspect of domination to various forms of monopolization and exclusion (Murphy, 
1986). Features of all kinds’ such as religion, gender, language, and lack of education 
can be used as grounds to close entry for outsiders (Murphy, 1983). Weber argues that 
“the unequal distribution of property 'excludes the non-wealthy from competing for 
highly valued goods; it favours the owners and, in fact, gives to them a monopoly to 
acquire such goods'” (Murphy, 1983: 633). Monopolization assures that certain 
groups are able to make “profitable deals in the market” (Murphy, 1983: 633), and 
closure theory analyses power and domination, focusing on the “monopolization of 
opportunities in the market” (Murphy, 1983: 633).  
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     Weber introduces two opposite relationships: open and closed. The former is 
including and the latter excluding. In an open relationship anyone is welcomed to join 
and participate, and in the closed relationship, “'participation of certain persons is  
excluded, limited, or subjected to conditions'” (Koch, 2006: 9). The excluded 
individuals are denied access to privileges and life chances and are denied entry to 
social and economic opportunities, named rights by Weber (Murphy, 1983). The 
monopolization of rights is created by the excluding group(s) to gain advantages over 
the excluded, and to acquire monopoly of the rights. The inequalities are kept in place 
by groups trying to preserve or increase their privileges and social status (O'Brien, 
2010). O'Brien (2010: 592) writes that if a relationship will be open or closed 
depends on “tradition, sentiment, or […] rational pragmatism” and “on which type 
best meets the needs of the dominant social group” (O'Brien, 2010: 592). The owners 
of property are in power since they may reject the terms of the exchange. Those 
without property must sell their labour power to the property owners and thus are put 
in an inferior position. The terms are set by the owners of property. Once again, 
monopolization comes into the picture. In sum, the dominating group closes the entry 
for others (Murphy, 1983).  
     Exclusion and domination are interrelated. The use of exclusion is a way to 
examine “structured social inequality” (Murphy, 1986: 27) and “domination is 
examined through the analysis of the power and control relations contained in the 
rules and codes of exclusion” (Murphy, 1986: 27). Society is governed by these rules.  
Although closure theory originates from Weber, the theory has been developed by 
others. Frank Parkin introduces exclusion and usurpation, strategies that can be 
applied to either increase or decrease power (Murphy, 1986). These are two opposite 
strategies to either increase or defend a group’s privileges and opportunities (Murphy, 
1983). Usurpation is the reaction, by the excluded, contra the exclusion. This non-
dominant group is thus in pursuit of the privileges they are excluded from (Koch, 
2006). In exclusionary closure the dominating group exercises power downwards to 
deny other groups’ access to the advantages. Thus, the excluded are subordinated 
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groups that the dominated group characterizes to be inferior (Murphy, 1983). It is 
about subordination (Murphy, 1986), perceiving the others as a secondary group 
being lower in status than one's owns. In usurpationary closure, a group exercises 
power upwards to increase their own opportunities and advantages. They try to obtain 
the dominated group's advantages (Murphy, 1983). The two strategies for power are 
either exclusionary or based on solidarity. As an example, O'Brien (2010) identifies 
the nation state as using both of these strategies. The nation state includes its 
members, but excludes non-members. Dual mode of closure means that middle 
groups in the stratification system uses both modes of closure; excluding and 
usurpation. The reaction of an already excluded group is to exclude an inferior group 
through “mobilizing power in a downward direction” (Murphy, 1986: 31). For the 
most part, one of the strategies, exclusion or usurpation is used, but as a complement 
the middle groups also use the other strategy to achieve their goals. Various conflicts 
between groups within the working class can illustrate an example. This could be 
compared with how the working class was created in the first place, through 
exclusion and also exploitation (Murphy, 1986). Exclusion is connected to a time 
frame; a specific form of exclusion can be legitimate and accepted during a certain 
period of time, with necessity as its justification. But exclusion patterns always 
change due to resistance and thus usurpation strategies. What was accepted as being 
excluded at one point does not mean that this will always be the case: take for 
example race and gender (Murphy, 1986).  
     Closure theory is relevant to migrant workers since they appear to regularly be 
subjected to exclusion in various ways. Previous research, as shown in sections 1.2.1. 
and 1.2.2., indicates that migrant workers often are excluded due to their status as 
non-citizens. Migrant workers are employed for low-skilled positions that are not 
attractive for the citizens of the host country. Migrant workers also run the risk of 
being excluded from voice and security, political participation, and are subjected to 
various restrictions based on their nationality. Many are under the risk of deportation, 
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and even if there are legal rights assuring their safety, there is a great uncertainty that 
people are aware of these rights, much less how to defend them.   
2.1.2. Exploitation  
Exploitation, a concept originating from the early 19
th
 century, refers to a certain 
relationship between people, namely when a person is being used in an unjust 
manner. When someone is being taken advantage of (Nielsen and Ware, 1997) the 
fairness required in the exchange is not respected (Mayer, 2007). The theory of 
exploitation is a theory with many dimensions, and it has a long and comprehensive 
tradition in political theory. What fairness requires is regarded differently, and 
therefore different theories of exploitation have developed.  
     Within neo-classical theory, the equilibrium price is seen as being fair; thus, 
market exploitation occurs if prices and wage diverge from the perfect equilibrium 
price. The perfect equilibrium price is set by consumer demand and producer supply 
when in perfect competition. Difference from the equilibrium price means unequal 
exchange (Mayer, 2007). 
     Karl Marx spoke about capitalist exploitation of workers. According to Marx, the 
workers “became wage slaves alienated by the productive process” (Nielsen and 
Ware, 1997: ix). Within Marxism, property should be owned collectively as for it to 
be as fair as possible, thus capitalism will always be exploitative; there is no equal 
access to the means of production (Nielsen and Ware, 1997). The owners of means of 
production exploit the workers through the surplus value; the employer extracts 
surplus value and profit when the workers work longer than necessary. This is 
possible since the workers do not have access to the means of production. Collective 
ownership of the means of production would end capitalist exploitation (Roemer, 
1985). In Koch (2006) Erik Olin Wright, based in Marxian theory, argues that 
exploitation is a form of exclusion: “exclusion denotes a situation in which the 
material benefits of one group are acquired at the expense of another group, coercive 
practices being an essential part of the process” (Koch, 2006: 7). 
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   Within exploitative exclusion, the exploiters extract labour power from the 
exploited, and within “non-exploitative exclusion there is no labour transfer from the 
excluded to the excluding group” (Koch, 2006: 7). The Marxian tradition views 
exploitation and exclusion as inherent features of capitalist societies, focusing on the 
process of production of wealth, when speaking of exploitation and exclusion (Koch, 
2006). Within a capitalist society, the employer and employee find themselves in 
different bargaining positions. The latter possesses more power than the former, and 
uses this power to gain advantaged over the employee. The unequal bargaining power 
is exploitative (Nielsen and Ware, 1997) and influences the work contract, which 
Wood (1997) denotes as a main vulnerability for workers.  
     Exploitation may also be referred to in a normative manner, as the use of power by 
one person over another who is in a less powerful situation, thus there is a 
relationship of unequal power (Nielsen and Ware, 1997). Exploiters gain at the 
expense of others. Even when both parties involved gain on the exchange, 
exploitation arises if one party is “failing to benefit the disadvantaged party as 
fairness requires” (Mayer, 2007: 137). Taking unfair advantages is cheating. The 
exploited may encounter  beneficial cheating: the disadvantaged party gains less on 
the exchange then it should for the transaction to be fair; employed workers might be 
better off than being unemployed, but if not enough compensated, they are exploited 
since the exploiter then gains on their expense. From the point of view that 
exploitation fails to benefit one party as fairness requires, Mayer (2007: 142) sets up 
three cases of exploitation; “exploiters either (1) do not benefit their victims at all, or 
(2) do not benefit them sufficiently, or (3) do not benefit them authentically”. Thus, 
exploitation harms the disadvantaged party. This is what Mayer (2007) points out as 
being fundamentally wrong in exploitation. But even if it is agreed on that 
exploitation is wrong, there are various thoughts on why it is a wrongful act. 
Exploitation can be coercive, when “the exploited are forced to benefit others, and 
that is not just” (Mayer 2007:137). It can also be degrading, when the exploited 
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person is “treated as means” (Mayer, 2007:137). Others claim that exploitation is bad 
since it contributes to people not protecting the vulnerable (Mayer, 2007: 137). 
     For persons to be exploited they need to be vulnerable in some way: physically, 
psychologically, emotionally, economically, or politically. The exploiter then takes 
advantage of the vulnerable person with the intention to gain something. Wood 
(1997: 15) suggests that exploitation is wrong when “proper respect for others is 
violated when we treat their vulnerabilities as opportunities to advance our own 
interests or projects. It is degrading to have your weaknesses taken advantage of, and 
dishonourable to use the weaknesses of others for your ends”. Taking unfair 
advantage of someone could lead to objectifying and treating that person as a tool, for 
example to reach profit, and thus not treating that person with respect (Nielsen and 
Ware, 1997). 
     Attas (2000) outlines two aspects of exploitation; unequal exchange and forced 
exchange. An exchange is unequal and therefore “exploitative if and only if one party 
(the exploited) receives a payment of lower value in return for the goods and services 
he supplies” (Attas, 2000: 75). Furthermore there must also be misleading 
information, deception and/or force (Attas, 2000). An exploited person would, if 
possible, not participate in the exchange, knowing that there was an inequality in the 
exchanged values. Meaning, if the person was fully aware that the exchange terms 
were not equal, participation in the exchange would be renounced. From this, Attas 
(2000) proposes that the questions to be asked, regarding if an exchange is 
exploitative or not, are if the wage is just and if there are other reasonable options for 
the workers, or if they are restricted with no real choice. Force, Attas (2000) explains, 
can occur in three ways. First, brute force involves selling something one wishes not 
to sell, or to sell that something to someone one wishes not to sell it to. Second, 
forcing terms of exchange means that the terms of exchange are conditioned from one 
party of the exchange. This is sufficient for it to be exploitative. Third, conditional 
force means “if a worker (or trader) wants to exchange their labour (or goods) then 
they must obey certain conditions other than the obvious condition of consent to pay 
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the agreed price” (Attas, 2000: 77). The conditions are restrictions of varying kind, 
imposed individually or politically.  
     Exploitation is a complex issue for policymakers; “if they prohibit the transaction 
they may worsen the plight of the disadvantaged party. By contrast, if the authorities 
permit the transaction they make it possible for advantaged agents to gain at the 
expense of the vulnerable” (Mayer, 2007:147). Exploiters might sometimes be 
operating within a legal framework, thus, “their cheating is structural” (Mayer, 2007: 
148). Authorities then need to come up with solutions on the structural level (Mayer, 
2007). Nielsen and Ware (1997) propose that either society could make it more 
difficult for potential exploiters to use their power for exploitation purposes of those 
in vulnerable situations, or it could try to empower people so they are less vulnerable 
to begin with, and hence less susceptible to exploitation. 
     The concept of exploitation is relevant to migrant workers since they appear to 
frequently be subjected to exploitation when considering the findings from prior 
research, sections 1.2.2. and 1.2.3: Migrant workers are repeatedly found working in 
low-skilled jobs, exposed to inequalities on the labour market. Migrant workers are 
often subjected to inferior working conditions than their locally born counterparts. 
They tend to be vulnerable and the vulnerability is connected to the terms upon which 
they are allowed to stay in the country, for example their employment is often 
connected to a specific employer and sometimes they face deportation when a 
contract is terminated. Consequently, there is an unequal bargaining power between 
the employer and migrant worker. The apparent lack of awareness concerning their 
rights and how to defend them leads to them being easier to exploit as cheap labour. 
2.2. (Re)commodification 
2.2.1. Labour as a commodity 
Both the UN and the ILO have promoted the opinion that labour differs from 
commodities, and that it should not and cannot be reduced to a commodity (Taksa 
and Groutsis, 2010). However, Varoufakis and Groutsis (2010: 1) argue that “to the 
extent that labour is a commodity, its characteristics are arguably, in a league of their 
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own”.  Labour as such can think for itself and it can never be completely controlled 
and secondly, has characteristics which distinguishes it from other commodities. 
Those characteristics include “agency, group identity, and action which challenge the 
notion of the workplace as a realm of consensual or pure exchange" (Varoufakis and 
Groutsis, 2010: 2). 
      Karl Polanyi, author of The Great Transformation, where he laid out the emerging 
development of market society (Papadopuolos, 2007), calls labour a fictitious 
commodity that is separated from other commodities as “human activity cannot be 
completely subordinated to the logic of the market” (Rosewarne, 2010: 105). Labour 
is a fictitious commodity, according to Polanyi, “because it is not manufactured to be 
sold on the market: people do not reproduce with the intention of providing more 
labour power” (Bandelj et. al., 2011: 814). Bandelj et. al. (2011: 814) also writes that 
”if human labor were to be treated as any other commodity to be sold on the market, 
then there would be no limit to the kinds and extent of its use by employers, resulting 
in exploitation and over exhaustion”. 
2.2.2 Commodification – Decommodification – Recommodification  
The transformation in society, which Polanyi speaks of, lasted from the 19
th
 century 
until the mid-20
th
 century. The transformation was ”guided by a deliberate strategy, 
led by financial capital, to create a market society where workers were left 
unprotected and subject to unbridled market forces” (Standing, 2007: 41). 
Everything, even labour, was attempted to change into a commodity supported by 
financial capital as more and more powerful (Standing, 2009). Economy was to 
dominate society and according to Bandelj et. al. (2011), commodification goes hand 
in hand with market society, the capitalistic society, and its characterized 
competitinvess and search for greater profits. Polanyi perceives the market society 
strategy to be untenable, and that policymakers need to protect people from the 
exuberance of the capitalist system, through for example policies (Papadopolous, 
2005). For the labour power to live when not being used in the labour market there 
needs to be “non-commodified support systems” in place (Holden, 2003: 303). 
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Approaches to do this would be through establishing social protection, managing 
market forces etc. These are the building blocks of welfare states today, however 
differently outlined they may be (Standing, 2007). 
      Decommodification is often used to explain why the welfare state is to be found 
in the capitalist society. Decommodification can be seen as a counterbalance strategy 
by the state against self-reliance on the market (Holden, 2003). According to Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen, author of The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, it is a way for 
the individual to exist outside the labour market without being totally left alone 
(Papadopuolos, 2007). There is the promotion of the self-regulated market but at the 
same time there are institutional arrangements in order to protect the person 
(Rosewarne, 2010). 
       Esping-Andersen analyses the modern welfare states through the concept of 
decommodification, which “'occurs when a service is rendered the individual to exist 
from as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without 
reliance on the market'” (Holden, 2003: 311). “Decommodification frees people from 
the market” (Holden, 2003: 304) in the sense that they are able to live a life separated 
from the market. Even though labour is commodified it can partly also become 
decommodified through access to various state benefits (Holden, 2003).    
     Esping-Andersen argues that employers never have promoted decommodification 
since it empowers the worker while decreasing the employers' power (Holden, 2003). 
Generally one could say that decommodification empowers the citizen against the 
market, and “decommodified social policies” (Holden, 2003: 304) ensure that people 
can make their own choices, independent from the market. Decommodification 
empowering workers “in transactions regarding their own labor” has decreased over 
the last fifty years (Garcia, 2006: 29). Garcia (2006) finds it hard to think of anything 
that is not being commodified, that cannot be bought and sold. Today there is a shift 
towards recommodification; “workers are seen as articles of commerce without 
bargaining power” (Garcia, 2006:29). 
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      Since the middle of the 1970s recommodification is occurring (Standing, 2007); 
there have been changes in the world economy, from the Keynesian welfare state 
(KWS) to the Schumpeterian workfare state (SWS) (Garcia, 2006). KWS was 
prominent during the 1950s to the 1970s, and was characterized by welfare and 
national territory orientation, a mixed economy of market and state and a “relatively 
closed national economy” (Jessop, 1999: 350). The change to SWS is a change 
towards a post national competitive workfare model. Neo-liberalism is the hegemonic 
version of SWS (Jessop, 1999). The welfare state is “being replaced by social policies 
emphasising (re-)commodification” (Dingedley, 2007:823). The state, within the 
SWS, still has an intervention role, but the character of that role has changed 
(Papadopolous, 2007). There are more strategies for “restricting the alternatives to 
participation in the labour market” (Papadoplous, 2005:7). The welfare state has 
become the competitive state (Holden, 2003). The shift to recommodification 
signifies to Holden “'a race to the bottom' as far as social policies are concerned” 
(Holden, 2003: 306). Social policy is subordinating the needs of labour market 
flexibility and international competition, and making labour a commodity. Therefore 
“the state is 'a commodyfing agent' rather than 'a deommodifying agent'” (Holden, 
2003: 307). Safeguards, such as policies and institutions, implemented to give labour 
a certain security has been dismantled (Garcia, 2006). Weakened labour laws have 
resulted in the voice of employees being undermined (Standing, 2009). Garcia (2006) 
claims that today almost everything can be offered on the market and it can be 
difficult to resist commodification in the globalized world. 
      Workers have gained more bargaining power over the terms and conditions of 
their employment over the last two centuries. However, this is threatened by 
”increased trade and manufacturing in areas where economic deprivation has 
decreased workers' bargaining power” (Garcia, 2006: 35). Today commodification is 
viewed upon as existing everywhere, but to various extents. What is important is the 
transactions and the bargaining power of the parties involved (Garcia, 2006). The 
new “comparative advantaged” is cheap labour (Garcia, 2006: 29); a country can 
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produce a commodity cheaper than another country and in turn exchange it for the 
other country's comparative advantage. In the end everyone benefit from the trade. 
Ultimately, all workers sell their labour power but it should be made as fair as 
possible for the parties involved to be able to have the possibility to protection 
(Garcia, 2006), and “the test of commodification is the extent to which workers have 
bargaining power and voice over substantive terms of their employment” (Garcia, 
2006: 36).  
      The concept of (re)commodifiction is relevant to migrant workers since previous 
research, in sections 1.2.2. and 1.2.3, suggests that migrant worker appear to often be 
treated as commodities. They have a lack of voice and are subjected to uneven 
bargaining between themselves and the employer. Often they do not enjoy free 
movement on the labour market. They are said to be a disposable workforce and 
admitted only when needed in a host country, and that in the end countries are 
looking for “labour, not people“ (Reilly, 2011: 145).  
2.3. Analytical framework  
The starting point for this study is the practical side of the migrant labour policy 
change in 2008: what the consequential flaws and strengths are as considered by 
actors in contact with migrant labour policy, and how these factors influence the 
situation, living and working conditions for migrant workers in Sweden today. The 
research question is, as previously stated in section 1.3.1: 
 
How can the Swedish labour immigration law for TCNs be understood from 
the perspective of actors in contact with labour immigration?  
 
The theoretical framework, as presented in this chapter, guides the interpretation and 
reflections of the gathered data to understand the current situation for TCN migrant 
workers in Sweden. The analytical framework is divided into three parts reflecting 
the three theories presented in the theoretical framework. 
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      The idea of the analytical framework is to investigate if and how the chosen 
theories, closure theory; exploitation; and (re)commodification, can be applicable in 
the Swedish context. The theories were chosen after considering the findings in the 
sections 1.1. and 1.2.. First, closure theory was selected due to the tendency for 
migrant workers to be excluded in society grounded in their status as temporary 
residents. Migrant workers are here on a permission connected to work, including 
various restrictions. Second, exclusion could lead to exploitation if migrant workers 
are in a vulnerable situation. It appears as though exploitation is prevalent when it 
comes to migrant workers on the labour market. This study proceeds from the 
Marxian tradition denoting that workers in a capitalistic society are exploited. Then it 
depicts the normative concept of exploitation focusing on the unequal relationship 
between employer and employee. Third, the dialectical form of commodification – 
decommodification – recommodification is connected to migrant workers being in 
Sweden for work, and work purposes only. The rise in recommodification implicates 
unequal bargaining power, unfairness of transactions and a lack of voice. By 
exploring the perspective of actors in contact with TCNs migration workers, this 
thesis strives to contribute to the academic understanding of strengths and flaws of 
the new system. 
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3. Methodology 
 
After presenting the theoretical framework, the methodological considerations for 
producing the data for the analysis will now be outlined. Two methods were used, 
semi-structured interviews and discourse analysis. These methods will be discussed 
and also a reflection of the study will be provided. The process of the final product, 
the thesis, has developed into a reflection between previous research, theory and the 
produced data. The thesis is derived from the idea of combining interests in labour 
market policies and migration policies. Due to that there is a lack of research 
regarding the 2008 changes to the legal framework; the idea of conducting research 
within the Swedish context came about.  
     The structure of the chapter is as follows: text analysis, selection of interviewees, 
interviews, quality criteria, and reflection on methods.  
 
3.1. Data collection  
The notion behind the thesis is to investigate possible consequences of the change in 
the legal framework for employment in Sweden for employees from a third country. 
The chosen methods for this qualitative study, interviews and discourse analysis, 
complement each other and generate comprehensive data concerning various impacts 
of the new law. Text analysis based on debate articles relevant to this study's purpose 
were used to gather foundational material for the analysis, alongside the conducted 
interviews. Also, the interviews were interpreted as part of the discourse analysis.  
3.1.1. Text analysis 
To create a well-grounded base for producing data, both debate articles and 
interviews were used. The debate articles are thought to provide a further 
understanding of how different actors conceive the consequences of the changed legal 
framework. Discourse analysis is a way of understanding how “socially produced 
ideas and objects that populate the world were created in the first place and how they 
are maintained and held in place over time” (Philips and Hardy, 2002:6). Texts are 
meaningful first when connected to other texts, to distinguish different discourses 
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(Philips and Hardy, 2002). Bryman (2012) points out that documents cannot be 
considered an objective truth of what they report. They have an ulterior purpose; 
“documents are significant for what they were supposed to accomplish and who they 
are written for” (Bryman, 2012:555). The context of the articles is always important 
to get an understanding of their purpose and to whom they are directed (Philips and 
Hardy, 2002). Documents should be “viewed as a distinct level of 'reality in' their 
own right” (Bryman, 2012: 554).  
       In this study, the ten debate articles
4
 chosen comment on the public political 
debate on migrant workers and migrant work. The articles were chosen from bigger 
Swedish newspapers with the general Swedish public as the intended audience. 
Ultimately, the articles were taken from two newspapers. This was not intentionally, 
but due to that the articles perceived to be relevant were published in these 
newspapers. It is compelling to analyse texts that “are produced by the most powerful 
actors, transmitted through the most effective channels, and interpreted by the most 
recipients” (Philips and Hardy, 2002:75). Thus, a selection of contributions to the 
discussion on labour immigration by TCNs to Sweden, through various debate 
articles published in bigger Swedish newspapers was carried out. The articles were 
written by representatives from various political parties, labour unions, trade industry, 
and the Migration Board. In 2012, the Migration board implemented more restrictive 
regulations effecting employers and labour standards. This motivated a sample 
including debate articles only written sometimes during the time-frame 2012 and 
2013 to capture the latest debates on labour migration in Sweden.  
     There exists an enormous amount of contributions to the discussion, and for this 
thesis it would be too lengthy a procedure going through each and every one of them. 
Relevant articles were selected but time and space limitations restricted the sample. It 
can be difficult to identify texts that are both relevant and manageably for the purpose 
of the analysis (Philips and Hardy, 2002). However, the selected articles were 
regarded as sufficient to address the purpose of the study and to “justify an interesting 
                                                          
4
  See Appendix C. for list of debate articles 
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argument” (Philips and Hardy, 2002: 74). Since the objective of the study is to raise 
awareness to the issue, articles from various significant actors were chosen in order to 
analyse the opinions (Philips and Hardy, 2002). 
     Both debate articles and interviews were coded into categories generated when 
analysing the rhetoric. Through the systematic separation of statements into these 
categories, patters in speech developed identifying the ways in which participants 
themselves actively construct and employ categories (Philips and Hardy, 2002). The 
underlying themes deriving from the findings were analysed in relation to the applied 
theories. Because of the political context of the study, and therefore also the selected 
articles, critical discourse analysis was applied to “focus more explicitly on the 
dynamics of power, knowledge, and ideology that surrounds discursive processes” 
(Philips and Hardy, 2002: 20).  
3.1.2. Selection of interviewees  
The study is a qualitative study including seven semi-structured interviews with 
participants from; two labour unions, Kommunal, the Swedish Municipal Workers’ 
Union and The Swedish Trade Union Confederation; one employer organization, The 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise; one NGO, Caritas; the Migration board; the 
Department of Justice; and one interviewee preferring to be anonymous. The strategic 
reasoning behind the selection of interviewees was to give a voice to various relevant 
actors in contact with questions relating to labour migrants coming to Sweden from 
third countries. The purpose of the thesis gave an indication of what actors could be 
potential interviewees providing the needed data for answering the research question. 
Therefore, proceeding from the purpose of the study, the selection of interviewees 
came about from purposeful sampling (Bryman, 2012). The priority was given to 
actors who were thought to possibly provide varying opinions and attitudes on the 
matter. This could then produce conflicting data (Yin, 2013), and allow, for the 
exploring at similarities and differences between the various interviewees (Bryman, 
2012). The idea was to, by including diverging viewpoints; a nuanced picture of the 
consequences caused by the change of law would be presented. 
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3.1.3. Interviews 
To obtain purposeful and comprehensive data to answer the research question, the use 
of qualitative interviews complemented the document analysis. Qualitative interviews 
have potential to provide rich and comprehensive answers, focusing on the 
interviewee's understanding of the issue. Also, in contrast to quantitative interviews, 
they allow the interviewer to move away from the interview guide and follow-up the 
answers of the interviewee (Bryman, 2012). The purpose was to understand the legal 
framework's advantages as well as disadvantages through comparison of the 
interviews. Even though flexible, it is possible to compare answers due to the built-in 
structure of the interview guide (Bryman, 2012).  
     To accomplish the purpose of the study, seven qualitative interviews were held 
with actors
5
 providing data on various issues concerning the new legal framework on 
labour immigration in Sweden. The interviews provided relevant and pertinent 
information that gave needed context that has otherwise not been explored within the 
setting at hand.  
      The interview guide
6
 was first constructed based on the proposition made by the 
government and the Swedish Green Party. The suggestions made by Kvale (Bryman, 
2012) on how to produce an interview guide was taken into consideration. 
Additionally, the idea was to cover aspects of the theoretical framework within the 
guide. As a result, it is possible to apply and test the selected theories in relation to 
the findings from the interviews. However, the intention was not to construct detailed 
questions regarding the whole law. Instead it was meant for the interviewees to speak 
freely about their experiences and understandings on the new law. But as to have an 
arrangement to fully cover the intended areas of interest for the study, the interview 
guide was used during every interview. 
       The interviewees were informed about the study through an informational sheet 
on the notion behind the study and terms of participation. Before conducting the 
interviews the participants were asked to sign a consent explaining their voluntary 
                                                          
5
 See Appendix B for list of interviewees 
6
 See Appendix A for interview guide 
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participation, the possibility to discontinue the participation at any time, the right to 
the final transcription of their own interview, and the choice to be anonymous or not. 
The last few minutes of the recording of one interview were unexpectedly lost 
because of unknown reasons. However, this should not have affected the total 
impression of the interview since it was just the very last few minutes that were not 
recorded. All interviews were held in Swedish at the interviewees’ workplaces. All 
quotes used from the interviews were approved by the interviewees to guarantee 
integrity and authenticity. Since English is not the first language of the researcher, 
proof readers assisted to achieve correct translations of the quotes.  
3.2. Quality criteria  
How to assess quality criteria for qualitative research is widely debated (Bryman 
2012; Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Flick 2006). It might be objected that reliability 
and validity are not criteria belonging in qualitative research. However, the important 
factor is to assess the production and presentation of data (Bryman 2012; Flick 2006). 
The researcher will influence the collection, coding and presentation in one way or 
another (Flick, 2006).  
     When it comes to validity, referring to “whether the researchers see what they 
think they see” (Flick, 2006: 371), signifying if the constructions deriving from the 
collected data “are grounded in the constructions of those whom they studied” (Flick, 
2006: 371). The findings should be well-founded in the produced data. The 
interpretations in the analysis are the researchers’ own perception of the produced 
data. Also, a decision is made concerning what data to use in the analysis. Another 
researcher might make other choices. However, the bias and influence can be 
somewhat limited. What the researcher can do to increase validity is to follow the 
guidelines for analysing interviews and articles through text analysis, and also reflect 
upon the findings in relation to theory. 
     It is important to be aware of one’s biases as to address, question, and counter act 
them as much as possible. The researcher can move past bias, critically review 
literature and interpret generated data by being aware of wearing 'biased lenses'.  
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3.3. Reflection on the methods 
The researcher, when performing qualitative research, cannot escape influencing the 
work. Therefore it is important to reflect upon the researcher's role within the study. 
First, there could be noticed a difference between the first and last interview. This 
could be connected to the knowledge gained through the interview process itself. 
Limitations as an interviewer were noticed when transcribing the interviews. 
Potential follow-up questions and new ideas were developed when reflecting on the 
already conducted interview. This should, however, not be an issue since the 
interviews were semi-structured. All interviews were conducted originating from the 
interview guide, and as far as possible the areas were covered. Two interviews did not 
provide as much information as the rest since the interviews; two officials could not, 
due to their positions, answer emotive questions. Questions had to be reformulated 
for them to answer. It would have been ideal to also conduct interviews with political 
party representatives, but due to time limitations this was not possible. As a means to 
still include political view points, articles were selected to cover some of the parties’ 
views and opinions on the matter. It is, however, impossible to capture all aspects of 
the discourse.  
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4. Analysis  
 
This section presents the results and analysis connected to the analytical framework 
and follows the same order as section 2. on the theoretical framework: exclusion, 
exploitation and (re)commodification.  
 
4.1. Exclusion  
The 2008 change in the Swedish labour immigration law framework introduced a law 
that is not only inclusive of EU citizens, but also TCNs. Many sources point out that 
there are various problems connected to the new legal framework, but that this is not 
a reason to return to the old legislation that is said to have been more excluding. 
Exclusion is often connected to a certain time frame (Murphy, 1986), and it could be 
that the reason for inclusion to a certain extent has to do with the expressed need and 
importance of competitiveness. Sweden has now opened up its labour market for 
TCNs and there seems to be the need for highly skilled migrant workers, and 
consequently increasing the country's competitiveness. The idea appears to be 
inclusive, to introduce an open relationship (Koch, 2006), to a certain extent, through 
opening up the Swedish boarders and labour market for TCNs. The new Swedish 
legal framework is demand driven and it is inclusive of both highly skilled and low-
skilled migrant workers. The majority of the data sources mentioned this aspect in 
one way or another, repeatedly focusing on the fact that employers today can decide 
for themselves which employees are best for the purpose at hand. For the employer, 
this is pointed out to be a positive change:  
 
”What works much better than before is that the employer decides whom to 
recruit irrespective of which country they originate from. We think that this is 
incredibly important, because it is actually only the person responsible for this 
employment who can anticipate both the short and long term needs, as well as 
know who you can chose from [to employ]” (Ekenger, Interview. 24 April 
2013). 
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This discourse
7
 is in line with that on so-called competitive immigration regimes
8
 
(Sachar, 2006). Sweden is a developed country in search of highly skilled migrant 
workers. However, the legal framework welcomes both highly skilled and low-skilled 
migrant workers; thus Sweden appears to differ from Sacher's (2006) discourse on 
competitive immigration regimes. One reason emphasized in the data explaining why 
employers employ migrant workers is that the labour supply in Sweden does not 
match the labour demand. Employers want to hire the person most suitable for the 
job, for the business to develop and expand. 
 
“One has to be aware of that there may exist unemployment in a country, but 
still exist a lack of labour within certain occupations or sectors, especially if 
you look at geographical parts of Sweden. [...] labour migration constitutes an 
important part as a complement to the labour market”. (Firpo. Interview. 26 
April 2013). 
 
Interviewees and debate articles point out that when and if everything works 
according to the rules, then there is freedom of movement and this is in favour of all 
parties involved; the employer can employ the person best suited for the job, Sweden 
can stand strong against future expected demographic challenges, the mentioned 
mismatch in the labour market is targeted, positions are filled that Swedish workers 
are less willing to take, and the employees are said to have the opportunity to develop 
their skills
9,
and also receive a higher income than would be possible in the country of 
origin:   
 
                                                          
7  A contrasting discourse expressing that employers actually are looking for cheap labour is 
discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
8
 See section 1.1. for more information on 'competitive immigration regimes' 
9
 It is not clear from the data if developing skills include both highly skilled and low-skilled 
workers. Generally, the generated data refers to migrant workers as a homogeneous group. Sometimes 
it is explicitly referred to highly skilled or low-skilled workers. 
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“It is about mobility, mobility across borders contributes in the long run to a 
development and equalization that we actually want. A positive equalization, 
actually meaning that people earn money that they otherwise would not have.” 
(Ekenger. Interview. 24 April 2013). 
 
Still, much of the emphasis is focused on the benefits for Sweden and the importance 
of the reform for the country's competitiveness. 
     The new legal framework implies that it is much easier to become employed in 
Sweden, and this development is said to have decreased the black labour market that, 
according to the sources, was widespread before 2008. Today migrant workers enjoy 
the possibility and legal right to be employed under decent work conditions. Once in 
Sweden, the migrant worker is allowed to change both work and employer
10
. A new 
work permit application has to be filled out, but this can be filed in Sweden. The 
change in labour immigration law has thus recognized the existence of labour 
mobility, opened up for what is referred to as free movement, and is said to have 
decreased the incentive to work illegally. According to one interviewee, Sweden 
differs from other countries in the sense that other countries might have an inability to 
admit the need for legal ways to enter a country to work. If there is no easy legal way 
to enter, the risk for migrant workers to be exploited might increase. 
     The legal framework allows and makes it easier to include TCNs, in the Swedish 
labour markets, who to a certain extent are employed on the same conditions as 
Swedish workers. However, the legal framework is not without various restrictions 
for TCNs. It implies certain exclusionary features (Murphy, 1983) towards TCNs, and 
thus, the Swedish government is practicing exclusionary closure. However, according 
to O'Brien (2010), it is nothing unusual for a nation state to exclude non-members 
while fully include its members. Through restrictions TCNs are legally being made 
inferior by the Swedish government. They are subordinated Swedish workers.  
Consequently, migrant workers are subjected to exclusion through distinct conditions 
                                                          
10
 see section 4.2. 
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and limitations on the labour market, which the Swedish workforce is not bound to. 
First, the migrant worker is supposed to be tied to one occupation for the first four 
years of working in Sweden, while for the first two of these four years, it is required 
to stay tied to the same employer. Second, if migrant workers, would like to, or find 
themselves impelled to change employers, they have three months to do so, after 
leaving the original place of work. If three months would pass without finding new 
employment, the migrant worker has to leave the country and if not, stay in Sweden 
on an illegal basis. Third, after four years, migrant workers may apply for permanent 
residency.  
     TCNs are excluded, through the mentioned various restrictions, from the labour 
market for the reason that they are not Swedish citizens. Migrant workers are 
accepted on the grounds of various restrictions that the domestic workforce is not 
subjected to. Migrant workers are subjected to exclusion since they are in Sweden 
under a temporary residence permit connected to the work permit. Thus, they are 
residents destined for the labour market under restrictive conditions (Attas, 2000). 
But the exclusion is not insuperable since they do have a chance to obtain a 
permanent residence permit after four years of stay.  
 
“That is great. Possibly, one could apply earlier. Now it is four years. As a 
result of getting a permanent residence permit one has exactly the same rights 
as a Swedish citizen, except for the right to vote in the parliamentary election. 
It is possible that four years is too long of a time to wait for that, […] because 
then you have the safeguard that you can stay here. Then you are no longer 
dependant on having employment for staying [...]” (Ekenger. Interview. 24 
April 2013). 
 
However, the rule appears complex, since others express that if the working 
conditions during the four years have not been met according to the rules, then it 
appears to be difficult to acquire the permit. It is suggested in one debate article that 
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the employee should, together with the employer, decide on the salary, instead of 
following what is the norm in Sweden. The writers assert that this would make it 
easier for the migrant worker to enter the Swedish labour market. However, they do 
not discuss the bargaining position of the migrant worker in relation to the employer. 
The quote below illuminates what is expressed to be an issue when trying to acquire 
the residence permit after four years of work:  
 
“The salary must comply with the collective agreements after four years, so 
even though you've gotten a salary of 17700 that four years ago complied with 
the collective agreements, if you have not received any raises then you are out 
of luck. [...] It's not just salaries, but all the employment conditions, so it’s also 
insurance and that stuff. And if you have an employer who has not paid the 
insurances then you haven’t worked during these four years according to the 
rules. You can stay, but you cannot count that [those four years]. Either the 
employer has to pay retroactively or you have to start working and hope you 
make the next four year trial. […] It is terrible.” (Ingesson. Interview. 25 April 
2013). 
 
A migrant worker in Sweden is legally not dependant on or bound to an employer in 
practice. Yet, it is clear from the data that the various actors think that this is not 
working in practice. They express the idea that migrant workers might not fully be 
aware of the laws: that they do have the legal right to change employer. Unclear 
information on the rules may create dependency for the migrant workers on their 
employer. Today there is a rule saying that migrant workers are supposed to be four 
years in the same occupation, and during the first two years with the same employer. 
 
”I hope and believe that one will reconsider this […]. For the sake of the 
individual to have the possibility to vote with one's feet, if not given the 
promised conditions, then that is a great strength if having the possibility to 
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continue searching [for work]. Now there is such a possibility to resign and 
search for a new job during three months […] That makes it even more 
confusing to have this rule to be bound to the first employer.” (Ekenger. 
Interview. 24 April 2013). 
 
The three months rule implies a risk of deportation. The risk of deportation if not 
employed could, in practice, make the employee dependant on the employer's good 
will. It can be difficult to find a new job and thus, the employee prefers to stay in an 
unsatisfactory employment. Migrant workers are in Sweden on basis of the work 
permit, and if the permit is withdrawn and they cannot find another job, they have no 
legal right to stay in the country. However, the migrant worker is free to find a new 
position and employer.  
 
“A labour migrant who leaves the employer does not automatically loose the 
residence permit. If giving notice there is the possibility to stay three months in 
Sweden to search for a new job. Only then the permit may be revoked. That 
possibility, to stay and search for a new job during three months, is regarded by 
the government as well balanced, which among other things is made clear by 
the bill to the current law” (Firpo. Interview. 26 April 2013).  
 
The actors expressed different opinions about the three months rule. Some thought it 
was too long, and some too short. Some did not know how long it should be, but that 
it should change. Some thought the current situation is okay since it actually is the 
same timeframe for an EU citizen coming to Sweden in search for work. 
 
“I had wished for a bit more than three months because one has to find a new 
job and that takes time.” (Joseph. Interview. 25 April 2013). 
 
“That [3 months] is a bit too long time for a person who has been here such a 
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short time and who has been exploited and not gotten his or her salary: that 
person has no one. To be here during three months living under bridges, as they 
do in Stockholm, creates misery and unbelievable suffering for people. They 
might not have money; they might not be able to get home. And then it is a 
failure to come home, it can be relatives and friends who have saved money to 
send one person here as for that person to then bring home money. People 
commit suicide in Sweden because they failed, such horrible stories are 
documented, they do not dare to come home and tell this to family and friends.” 
(Olsson. Interview. 18 April 2013). 
 
“You have come here, and you have three months to find a new real job that you 
have to state in the application, you have no Swedish work experience, you 
have maybe come to the hotel- and restaurant profession where the 
unemployment is 9,10 %, and you will fight with all the others [about the jobs ]. 
No, that is difficult.” (Ingesson. Interview. 25 April 2013). 
 
There appears to be a lack of informing TCNs about the legal framework
11
. 
Unawareness of the rules could lead to exclusion since they would not know what 
rights they are entitled to claim. TCNs should enjoy the same labour market 
conditions as Swedish workers. Still, it appears as though large parts do not. 
     It is suggested that the relationship between an employer and a TCN can be 
unequal if the latter is in a vulnerable situation. Thus, the relationship can be 
characterized by dominance and power (Murphy, 1983) on the expense of the migrant 
worker. For example, uninformed migrant workers might have little voice when it 
comes to the bargaining position. Moreover, the employer is in charge of the 
employment for the migrant worker who is in Sweden due to the job. It may be 
expressed that irresponsible employers exercise power downwards to exclude migrant 
workers from their legally entitled work conditions (Murphy, 1986). They are 
                                                          
11
 see section 4.2 
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subordinated the employers, and thus the employers may make profitable deals in the 
labour market if not meeting the legally correct work conditions. It is suggested that 
this would be cheaper for the employer than to employ on decent work conditions. 
The stay in Sweden is based on being here to work. If not having an employment 
there is legally no reason for the migrant worker to stay. It is expressed in the data 
that there is a risk that irresponsible employers take advantage of this situation and 
practice power and dominance on the expense of the migrant workers.  
 
4.2. Exploitation  
 
Speaking of words connected to abuse of migrant workers by irresponsible employers 
in Sweden, the data demonstrates: abuse or exploitation
12
, job trafficking, cynical 
treatment. Every source touched upon this topic, but emphasized it to different 
extents: some occupations, the majority follow the rules, a small part is irresponsible, 
both irresponsible and responsible employers, and that a shadow society has 
developed. Further there are descriptions of migrants as vulnerable, without legal 
rights, or enslaved. Thus, it is expressed in the generated data that exploitation of 
migrant workers does exist in the Swedish labour market. There appears to be 
cheating by irresponsible employers taking advantage of the legal framework and 
consequently also of the migrant workers.  
     It is pointed out that many migrant workers benefit from coming to work in 
Sweden. They have the possibility to develop their skills and other positive 
opportunities. However, the data suggests that migrant workers, often with a seasonal 
job, seem vulnerable and exposed to exploitation on the Swedish labour market.  
     However distinct the views on the spreading of irresponsible employers in 
Sweden, it was expressed that they do constitute a problem leading to the risk for 
certain migrant workers to be exploited in various ways. Migrant workers are at risk 
to be subjected to worse work conditions than is stated in the offer of employment: 
                                                          
12
 'utnyttjande' in Swedish  
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they can be forced to work for free, and even be exposed to job trafficking. 
Irresponsible employers seem to regularly take advantage of certain migrant workers 
since they fail to compensate them as fairness requires (Mayer, 2007): they are 
deprived of their rights and salary (Basok, 2004). The data expressed that all workers 
in Sweden should enjoy the same working conditions, and that there should 
absolutely not exist two separate models: one for Swedish workers and one for 
migrant workers. However, there are migrant workers who appear to be insufficiently 
compensated, cheated on, and in the end it is the employer who gains in the un-fair 
exchange. Thus, according to Mayer (2007), the migrants are exploited. 
     It is pointed out that abuse and cheating the system have always existed. The 
difficulty to criminalise irresponsible employers is expressed. Different from the old 
legal framework is that now there is an easy and legal way to access the labour 
market that should decrease the incentive to work illegally. This is also said to bring 
with it diminishing abuse since it is easier to discover if migrant workers do not enjoy 
the right working conditions. Still, it is pointed out that exploitation exists because 
employers now have the discretion when deciding who can come to Sweden to work. 
It is pointed out by one interviewee that it is a flaw not to know the reason behind 
why employers take in TCNs.  
     Some migrant workers appear to be exposed to exploitation due to unequal power 
between them and the employer. They are being used in an unjust manner (Nielsen 
and Ware, 1997). According to the Marxian tradition workers are exploited in general. 
This is an inherent feature of capitalism (Nielsen and Ware, 1997; Koch, 2006). It 
appears as though migrant workers in Sweden risk to be exposed to extra-
exploitation; they tend to end up in a vulnerable situation and are hence easy targets 
for exploitation. Migrant workers are new in Sweden, and if not aware of the rules, 
their rights and obligations connected to their stay, due to lack of information or 
misleading information, there is a risk for exploitation. On the other hand some 
migrant workers know that they earn less than the rules allow, and that they are 
subjected to bad working conditions. They do accept this since they earn more in 
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Sweden than they would in their country of origin. It is suggested that these are both 
highly skilled migrant workers, but also low-skilled migrant workers, who know 
where to get current and valid information.  
 
“They want to provide for their family, so it is essentially about, even though 
knowing it is not good paid, the norm, they are not happy with this, they know 
they work many hours per day. But the salary they can collect may help their 
family, that is decisive.” (Joseph. Interview. 25 April 2013). 
 
Thus, it appears as though some migrant workers participate in the exchange even 
when they know it is wrong. It is pointed out that they subordinate themselves to 
these working conditions as their salary is better in Sweden than in their country of 
origin, and the point of migrating for work is to work, and often to save money to 
benefit the families and relatives back home. However, un-fair exchange is 
exploitative even if both parties benefit from the exchange (Attas, 2000; Mayer, 
2007). For the migrant workers to have the possibility to enjoy a fair exchange and 
have the chance not to be exposed to exploitation, they need to know the legal 
framework and terms for decent work conditions. Due to lack of information and 
vulnerability, sometimes migrant workers are forced to work a period of time without 
payment when arriving to Sweden. This is said to sometimes occur within some 
occupations, such as care companies and cleaning companies. It seems that some 
migrant workers are unaware of the rules, and think they are completely dependent on 
the employer, who they do not dare oppose:  
 
“Since many of the employees do not know their rights, they think they are 
totally dependent on the employer. They do not dare to oppose their employer. 
How often does a regular Swedish employee oppose their employers? [...] Most 
people [Swedish employees] do not dare to do it, then think about someone 
coming from outside without knowing anything about the cultural- and legal 
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contexts in Sweden. Often, the information he or she gets is based on wrong 
information that is conveyed via a recruitment agency or the person using 
them.” (Joseph. Interview. 25 April 2013). 
 
There does not seem to be a comprehensive information network for migrant workers 
about their rights and obligations. Certain actors have their own information channels 
to reach migrant workers with the purpose of informing and clarifying the rules to 
them, but they do not have the resources to reach out to each and every one. Many of 
the authorities in Sweden, such as the Migration Board, the Swedish Tax Office, The 
Swedish National Insurance Agency, provide information. But it seems that some 
migrant workers do not fully take part of this information. The lack of comprehensive 
information reaching the migrant workers about their legal rights is a contributing 
factor to the risk of exploitation. This is systematically pointed out in the data. The 
lack of knowledge is taken advantage of by irresponsible employers providing 
misleading information, informing wrongly about current rules or not informing at 
all, and thus depriving the workers of their rights. Unawareness of the legal 
framework is used by irresponsible employers as a means of pressuring migrant 
workers to work under working conditions not in line with what is praxis in Sweden.  
      The threat of deportation also contributes to a vulnerable situation for the migrant 
worker (Reilly, 2011; Walia, 2010) who might surrender to bad working conditions. 
They might be aware of that it is wrong and unfair but they cannot find a new job, 
where the legal framework is respected, within three months. Or it might be so that 
they are actually not aware of the fact that they legally have the right to give their 
notice and to stay in Sweden during three months.  
 
“It often happens that they do not know. That's what we have seen under the 
new law as well, attempts to exploitation […] If the employee wants a job, they 
will accept any conditions […].” (Joseph. Interview. 25 April 2013). 
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What appears to be a prime problem and flaw in the legal framework is the relation 
between the legally non-binding offer of employment on which the work permit is 
based and the legally binding work contract that is signed once in Sweden.  
 
“A problem is that many employees are exploited by irresponsible employers. 
One part of the problem is that one has to present an offer of employment  when 
applying [for the work permit]. The offer is not binding. For many it means that 
you come here with an offer that, once in Sweden, changes to an employment 
contract. The content might then be different. That the offer has the logotype of 
the Migration Board can surely make many people believe that it is a binding, 
official document.” (Lindberg. Interview. 8 May 2013). 
 
The difference between the work offer and work contract appears to confuse workers, 
and irresponsible employers cheat the confused employees out of work conditions 
they legally are entitled to. The data suggest that certain actors think the offer of 
employment should be legally binding. However, it is expressed that there are 
problems with having binding contracts. Due to long administrative waiting times, 
often several months, it is difficult to sign a legal contract, not even knowing if the 
permit will be issued. Then the conditions should be exactly the same when coming 
to Sweden, which could be after several months; if the employment even still exists. 
The business company might not be able to guarantee the same work conditions for a 
longer period of time. It is pointed out that running a company is a risky business. It 
might not even be clear for how long the company will exist. If the work terms have 
changed or if the employment has ceased to exist, it is a problem for the employee, 
not the employer, and the three months rule applies. When coming to Sweden and 
realizing that the offer of employment is not legally binding puts many migrant 
workers in a vulnerable situation. They might have highly invested for making it 
possible to come to Sweden to work, and now they might be in the hands of an 
irresponsible employer who then sets new and un-fair terms of exchange conditions.  
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“This risk division, the reasonable thing is that all three [employer, employee 
and society] shall share the risk. Today 100 % is placed on, as we see it, the 
employee. Often it is they who have paid for the flight ticket; maybe they have 
quit their old job in their country of origin, which there are lots of costs 
associated with, so they can never be free from the risk. But then we say that the 
employer must take some of the risk, and then we say binding employment 
contracts, not just this offer of employment that is not legally binding.” 
(Ingesson. Interview. 25 April 2013). 
 
From the generated data it is not possible to know to what extent force (Attas, 2000) 
is included when making migrant workers work under other conditions than firstly 
stated. Neither is it possible to say how frequent it is for the stated work conditions in 
the offer of employment to change. Still, it appears that migrant workers can be 
vulnerable due to the confusion caused by the legally non-binding offer of 
employment. However, the vulnerability and change of contract varies from case to 
case.  
     A visible gap in the legal framework expressed in the data is the control 
mechanism for making sure that the working conditions for TCNs are followed as 
they should. The lack of oversight may result in migrant workers being deprived of 
their salary and other rights that they should enjoy when working in the Swedish 
labour market. Some actors, employer organizations and labour unions appear not to 
have legal rights to do random controls once the worker has arrived to Sweden.  
     The labour unions are allowed to do check-ups if the employment is under a 
collective agreement. If there are collective agreements in a company, or if the 
migrant worker is a union member, the union is then able to review if salaries have 
been paid according to the union agreements:  
 
“We say that if you [the migrant workers] want to become a member [of the 
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union] then you are most welcome, so we can help you. Because those who we 
can help are our members. We helped many non-members at first, but then we 
had so much to do just with our own members who are not getting their 
conditions met, so we have had to prioritize a little.” (Olsson. Interview. 18  
April 2013). 
 
Employer organizations also do check-ups in case they hear of any irregularities 
connected to the employment. Other than that, the same supervision as for other 
Swedish workplaces applies; the Work Environment Authority (WEA), Tax Office, 
and the Police are in charge. If migrant workers are not members of a union, they 
may turn to a private lawyer for assistance in case they would like to pursue a cheated 
salary. Also, they can always turn to the WEA if the work problems have to do with 
the work environment. The WEA is also the supervisory authority when the work 
place does not have a collective agreement, and the workers have worked too many 
hours. Thus, if migrant workers want to file a complaint against an employer, they 
could talk with the unions, their employer organization, or other authorities, 
depending on the problem. They do have the possibility to demand their legal rights. 
The difficulty is that migrant workers might not be aware of this:  
 
“What knowledge does an employee from Cameroon have about that we have a 
Work Environment Authority.” (Olsson. Interview. 18 April 2013). 
 
As mentioned, controls are done if an issue arises. However, interviewees indicate the 
controls as currently being insufficient for overcoming exploitation: 
 
“You know who is committing the crime, plain and clear, but still we do not 
have a legislation to get those who publicly are exploiting. Everyone is 
perplexed and cannot do anything.” (Joseph. Interview. 25 April 2013).   
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Since 2012, stricter controls of the working conditions are implemented by the 
Migration Board due to noticed cheating and many migrant workers being deceived 
of their salaries. The authority verifies if there is any activity in the company and 
employers are obliged to demonstrate that they have the financial means to pay the 
salary stated in the offer of employment:   
 
“We chose certain occupations where we could see many problems. We then 
placed higher demands on these occupations. This is really a natural way to 
work and gives bigger effect than random controls. The new demands play an 
important role in the work to protect people from exploitation by companies 
who do follow the rules. Since the demands were adopted there has been a 
decrease in the number of granted applications for the work permits within 
many of the occupations included by the stricter demands.” (Lindberg. 
Interview. 8 May 2013). 
 
The Migration Board has a new feature called 'certification,' which means that certain 
companies that have proven that they do not cheat the rules are certified and the 
turnover time for them when employing TCNs is five days. One interviewee claimed, 
however, that the recruitment need has to be at least 25
13
 employees to become 
certified, and stressed the unfairness for small or new companies who are in an 
expansive period. The new rules are said to have improved the work conditions for 
certain occupations, such as berry pickers. Now the employer has to guarantee a 
salary according to collective agreements. However, cheating still exists:  
 
“Despite the increased control it is working far from perfect. We still see that 
there appears to be cheating and that the employee is exploited in the Swedish 
labour market.” (Lindberg. Interview. 8 May 2013). 
 
                                                          
13
 The mentioned figure has not been verified by the author. For further information on certified 
companies, please visit www.migrationsverket.se 
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”It is not possible to criminalise dishonesty; if one is dishonest one usually 
finds ways to exploit someone else”. (Joseph. Interview. 25 April 2013). 
 
Controls might be thought of as something positive that should be in favour of the 
migrant worker. However, when controlling the work conditions and finding out that 
they are not in accordance with the promised deal on which the work permit was 
issued or what is the norm in Sweden, the worker risks losing the employment if the 
employer does not change the conditions. The worker then loses the job due to poor 
work conditions, and has to find new employment within three months.  
 
“[...] many react to that no one is controlling [the working conditions/salaries], 
but with the current legal framework then I do not see that it would help a damn 
much to check. One would not charge the employer for anything, but the 
employee would be out [of Sweden].” (Ingesson. Interview. 25 April. 2013). 
  
4.3. (Re)commodification 
The new legal framework is said to be a great reform for Sweden as a country, 
increasing competitiveness with the possibility to employ highly skilled migrant 
workers who are needed in the Swedish labour market. This goes hand in hand with 
the notion of the competitive state in the neo-liberal paradigm, where it is said to be 
difficult to resist commodification (Garcia, 2006; Bandelj 2011).  
     As mentioned before, the data suggests that work is what legitimizes the stay for 
the migrant worker in Sweden. From the data, it may be suggested that migrant 
workers in Sweden are commodified to the extent that they are here for work 
purposes only. However, it could still be expressed that they are not commodified 
enough for the labour market since they, to a certain extent, are not permitted to freely 
compete on the Swedish labour market. They are supposed to be connected to one 
employer or at least one occupation for two consecutive years, and the following two 
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years to a distinct occupation. Migrant workers have the right to be a part of the 
labour market, but are subjected to limited access and thus excluded to fully take part. 
Within the neo-liberalism everything is supposed to be sold and bought without 
restrictions (Garcia, 2006). The idea to be destined to one work sector alone seems 
not to correspond well with the capitalistic competitive thought of an open market.  
       There are conflicting ideas in the data concerning the demand for migrant 
workers, and migrant workers being perceived as commodities. There are two 
contrasting discourses to be found: first, the idea that certain migrant workers are 
being treated as cheap labour, and that employers, see an opportunity to access docile 
labour instead of employing Swedish workers:  
 
“The employer knows that they [migrant workers] are prepared to work 12 
hours. A Swede is not allowed to do that, because one does not have the 
strength to do that. They do it, they can work 7 days a week. If it rains or snows 
or whatever. That is to say, they earn so enormously much more than what they 
get in the country of origin so they are prepared to subject themselves to bad 
conditions [...] and if they get sick then they do not demand, they do not know 
all their rights. […] I am pretty sure one gets out more work from them than 
what one gets from someone living in Sweden, per worked hour.” (Olsson. 
Interview. 18 April 2013). 
 
“It has for us, since the law changed, been obvious that employers see their 
chance to get hold of cheap and docile labour to their activities” (Bengtsson 
and Ojanne. Debate article. 2013). 
 
The second expresses the idea that the employers, and Sweden as a nation, are in 
need for qualified and suitable employees and that migrant workers then have the 
opportunity to legally come to Sweden to earn a living or develop their skills, 
exemplified by the quote below:  
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“It is about individuals choosing to come to Sweden to work under a longer 
period or shorter period of time. That is a choice you make in relation to what 
one would be able to achieve in one’s home state” (Ekenger. Interview. 24 April 
2013). 
 
Within the concept of (re)commodification it is important to consider the fairness of 
the transaction and the relation in bargaining power between the parties involved 
(Garcia, 2006). It could be suggested that migrant workers are more exposed to 
greater vulnerable situations than the regular Swedish worker due to lack of 
information and consequently, lack of voice in the bargaining situation with the 
employer. As expressed in earlier parts of the analysis, it is suggested that certain 
migrant workers are vulnerable, and that they are in an inferior bargaining position in 
relation to their employer. It is expressed in the data the employers look both for low-
skilled and highly skilled migrant workers. The low-skilled occupations are 
sometimes referred to as jobs which the Swedish domestic workers are not willing to 
accept: low-skilled jobs where the unemployment rates are high. It may be, for 
example, that the jobs are located in less attractive geographical parts in the country. 
Due to the described circumstances migrant workers could be thought of to be in a 
great bargaining situation. However, the expressed lack of voice for certain migrant 
workers might be decreasing their bargaining power (Garcia, 2006).  
     The level of voice migrant workers have over their own employment terms can be 
discussed. They might or might not know the rules. It seems that the case can be that 
either they are not happy with the terms but accept it, and thus subordinate 
themselves, anyways. Or they know that they have the right to stay three months in 
Sweden in the search for a new job and can then say no to unfair deals. The complex 
situation arises when they are not aware of their rights. This could implicate that they 
do not have a strong voice when it comes to the terms for their work conditions, and 
are thus situated to a great extent in the paradigm of re-commodification. Without a 
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voice over their own employment terms it could be speculated if it is more accessible 
to treat migrant workers as a commodity. As mentioned in section 4.1., one debate 
article expressed the idea that migrant workers would agree upon a salary together 
with the employer, irrespective of the collective agreements. This would make it 
easier for the migrant worker to access the Swedish labour market. It is also 
expressed that the salary should still be big enough so that the migrant worker would 
decide to come to Sweden to work. The question is how big of a voice the migrant 
worker actually possesses, and how great the bargaining power is if not having a 
norm to lean against. Other data suggests that the offered salary in Sweden might be 
good, in comparison with the salary in the country of origin, but that it can be 
considered a 'starvation salary' for a Swedish worker. Hence, drawn from the 
theoretical concept of (re)commodification this would make the migrant worker a 
commodity for the labour market. 
     However, it is implicated that the current legislation for migrant workers in 
Sweden does take into consideration that migrant workers are persons that are not 
treated as if being pure commodities. Besides from having the right to almost the 
same working conditions as Swedish workers, they also enjoy the right of family 
reunification.  
 
“The law does not just take into consideration that we need their labour, but 
also to protect the basic rights of the individual, for example the right to a 
family life. The right to family reunification is included. There are not such 
restrictions: once you have gotten your permit in Sweden everyone are treated 
equally. That is missing in most countries: they need employees, no one else. 
Then we are not thinking about that he or she have a family, the same dreams 
and expectations as everyone else […] but in our debates and discussion it does 
sound as if the law is grounded almost in evil, which is a bit strange, then we 
have not seen the positive in the legislation […] every state has different 
approach to migration […] we want your labour, when it is not needed, go 
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home. On the basis of that context Sweden has another viewpoint.” (Joseph. 
Interview. 25 April 2013). 
 
Exploitation of migrant workers is expressed to have occurred even before the change 
in the legal framework. However, it is now said to be easier to access a work permit 
in Sweden, and this could also be a potential gateway to access the rest of Europe. It 
is suggested that consequently today there exists a market where work permits are 
being bought and sold, and also where organised crime takes advantage of the 
expressed few controls on the reasons behind an employer or employee are applying 
for the work permit. It is also said that few sanction possibilities towards cheating 
contribute to cheating. The notion of trafficking persons for work purposes is 
expressed in the data. It is not indicated if this phenomenon is widespread, but it is 
indicated as existing. People are tricked to pay fees for a work permit, to a kind of 
middleman between the Migrant Board and the employee, even though this does not 
exist legally. They are then promised different kinds of work conditions but in the end 
this is not fulfilled. Once in Sweden the migrant worker is used as labour power or 
for sexual abuse, Also, they are sometimes forced to work for free. It is suggested that 
migrant workers destined for the Swedish labour market have been sold as labour 
power in Europe. Thus, the migrant workers become a commodity on the Swedish 
and European labour market.  
 
“They [Hotel & Restaurant Union] have met employers who have said: 'We get 
offers for labour market immigrants all the time. Also, people come here saying 
that, you can buy chefs from me, you can rent them, and then they have invited 
restaurant staff (to Sweden) that becomes some sort of black employment 
agency. They are selling them, not as a real recruitment agency but they are 
cheap and they are worth money because they are cheap. Then they are sold to 
the next employer. That is trafficking, trade with people. And that absolutely 
happens” (Ingesson. Interview. 25 April 2013). 
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“It [the current legal framework] has also opened up for job trafficking and 
exploitation of migrant workers. The information on the extent of  the criminal 
trade of work permits that has established in Sweden is alarming”. (Lindholm 
et al. Debate article. 2013). 
 
“[...] it is a human right to work. But it is not a human right to own and have at 
one's disposal the labour of others”. (Bengtsson and Ojanne. Debate article. 
2013). 
 
When residing in Sweden for twelve months or longer, a non-citizen may be 
nationally registered and is then entitled to enjoy almost the same rights, both 
employment-based and residence-based, as a Swedish citizen. From the data it is not 
possible to distinguish how the situation looks concerning migrant workers and their 
livelihood without reliance on the labour market (Holden, 2003) when not nationally 
registered. As seen in section 4.1, it was suggested that some migrant workers do not 
have enough resources to maintain a living if they would lose their job. Some actors 
expressed that this is an issue and pointed out that migrant workers might only be 
protected, in the sense to maintain a living outside the labour market, if having their 
own private insurance. However, according to section 1.1.4., migrant workers should 
be covered by employment-based benefits as Swedish workers, and the insurance is 
valid during three-months after finishing working. Migrant workers staying in 
Sweden for less than a year are not entitled to health care compensation and should 
therefore sign their own insurance. From the data it is not clear to make statements 
about to what extent migrant workers take part of employment and residence-based 
benefits and allowances. However, from the collected data irresponsible employers 
seem to intentionally hide information about working and residing in Sweden from 
certain migrant workers. Employers might not pay the insurance fee, or not pay the 
right amount. Also, one interviewee mentioned migrant workers who live in misery 
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when not having a job. There is a risk that they have not been informed about the 
rights to benefits. They are exploited, due to unawareness, on the Swedish labour 
market and not aware of their entitlements and thus, cheated on benefits and 
allowances. By law, migrant workers are entitled to take part of employment and 
residence-based benefits. What benefits they are entitled to depends on the lengths of 
their stay, income and for how long they have working in Sweden, but they have the 
same rights are Swedish workers. However, if not being aware of the rules, not 
registered and thus not applying for benefits, how is a migrant worker supposed to 
maintain a living outside the labour market?  
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5. Conclusion  
5.1. Summarizing discussion 
This study has investigated the Swedish labour immigration law for third-country 
nationals, TCNs, who are persons coming from outside the EU, ESS, and 
Switzerland. Data, generated through conducted interviews and document analysis, 
shows how certain actors in contact with the issue perceive the current situation for 
TCNs. The produced data was then examined through the lenses of the analytical 
framework, consisting of closure theory, exploitation and (re)commodfication. 
     First, Sweden wants to participate in the search for highly skilled migrant workers 
to address the mismatch in the labour market, and also to contribute to 
competitiveness on a global scale. The Swedish immigration law is therefore, to an 
extent, inclusive for TCNs. However, Sweden practises exclusion for migrant 
workers and the terms for their participation are set by the Swedish government. 
Migrant workers might legally be entitled to the same working conditions as Swedish 
workers, but they are excluded from taking part in the Swedish labour market on the 
same conditions as Swedish workers. The idea to return to the former system is 
mentioned in the data, but others think that would be a step in the wrong direction 
claiming that inclusiveness is better, but that improved control mechanisms needs to 
be developed. The employer seems to dominate the relationship due to the various 
restrictions in combination with lack of awareness of the rules. Thus, it could be that 
the employer, if irresponsible, sets the terms for the exchange differently from what is 
in the offer of employment. 
     Second, irresponsible employers are a main focus throughout the data. They 
constitute a complex problem indicating that it is possible to take advantage of 
migrant workers within the current Swedish system. Certain migrant workers tend to 
be vulnerable and subjected to unequal bargaining positions as a result of their visa 
status on the labour market. Lack of awareness of the legal framework and thus their 
rights and obligations could make migrant workers believe they are not allowed to 
 58 
 
stay in the country in search for a new employment. Instead, they are possibly 
vulnerable victims exposed to exploitation by irresponsible employers treating them 
as commodities, and not sufficiently rewarding them. There are many authorities to 
which the migrant worker can file a complaint if being exploited. However, if not 
aware of the rules it is difficult to know where to turn. The whole situation causes 
that some migrant workers are subjected to what could be called extra-exploitation, 
when departing from the Marxian analytical concept of exploitation. A big issue 
appears to be the offer of employment which causes confusion since it is not a 
legally-binding contract. However, it is pointed out that there are difficulties 
connected to making an offer binding: long administrative handling processes and 
also, companies might not be able to promise conditions for a time-period of two 
years, not even knowing they will exist in two years’ time. Stricter controls to 
discourage exploitation appear to hit the migrant worker who will be subjected to the 
three-month rule if authorities find out the work conditions are not in accordance with 
what is the norm in Sweden. It is pointed out that the risk dichotomy is only on the 
employee. There are appeals for the possibility to sanction against irresponsible 
employers.  
     Third, there is a risk for migrant workers to be treated as commodities in the 
Swedish labour market due to their indicated un-equal bargaining position in relation 
to the employer. Also, their status in the country is based on being in Sweden for 
work purposes only. However, by law they are supposed to be decommodified to the 
same extent as a domestic worker. The framework of this thesis does not allow for an 
investigation how that works in practice. Some migrant workers on work purpose 
visas appear to be exposed to cheating and the loss of voice and bargaining power 
over their own employment terms. Migrant workers are entitled to both employment-
based and residence-based benefits and allowances. However, the benefits depend on 
the salary and how long the person has worked in Sweden. Thus, the possibility to 
survive outside of the labour market differs between individuals. However, it seems 
that certain migrant workers are not aware of how the Swedish system works due to 
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irresponsible employers. Would they apply for the benefits they are entitled to? From 
the data it is expressed that they do not enjoy their entitled benefits. However, this 
theme needs to be investigated further. For those planning to work a shorter period of 
time the recommendation appears to be to buy private health insurance. Once again, 
they are here to work and there might not be alternatives for them to the labour 
market. Decommodified or not, in the sense of being able to maintain a living outside 
the labour market, it can be argued that migrant workers are not commodified enough 
since they cannot freely move and compete on the labour market. In the neo-liberal 
paradigm everything is supposed to be sold and bought but migrant workers in 
Sweden are subjected to various restrictions limiting them to sell their labour power 
as they like. The employers then miss out on what could have been a good match for 
a job position. Is Sweden, with the objective to be competitive on the global market, 
looking for a commodity: highly skilled migrant workers? It appears that certain 
migrant workers in Sweden are used for sexual abuse and being exploited as 
commodities on the Swedish labour market. They are denied the promised conditions. 
The work permit is suggested to be a gateway into Sweden for other purposes than 
stated in the work permit application. The market for work permits is mentioned and 
as well as how organised criminals use the system for criminal activities.  
     The Swedish legal framework for labour immigration for TCNs can be understood 
as a complex policy according to actors in contact with labour migration; it has both 
flaws and strengths. The results of the study indicated two distinct discourses: the 
employer's right to self-determination and the assumption of various problems in the 
legal framework. However different emphasis on discourse between actors the data 
systematically opposes irresponsible employers taking advantage of the system and 
migrant workers. It seems to be difficult to overcome the complexity of problems 
connected to this, since it currently appears to be the migrant workers who carry the 
major part of the risk when denouncing exploitation.  
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5.2. Limits and weaknesses 
 This study contained a limited number of participants and a limited selection of 
articles. It would have been a strength to have collected data from a wider group of 
participants plus analysing other documents than newspaper debate articles. The 
study would also have gained on a further developed interview guide and deeper 
interviews. This is a qualitative study which purpose is not to make broad 
generalisations. Instead, this is an introduction towards further investigations on 
related themes. However, due to time and budget limitations, as well as space 
limitations, it was not possible to expand and further develop the study.  
     Unresolved questions have been raised during the process of this study. These 
themes were beyond the framework for this study, but could be suggested for future 
research. First, to involve TCNs in a study would be beneficial as to provide an 
insight on how individuals themselves understand their current situation in Sweden. 
That would enable investigations on flaws and strengths regarding their 
understanding of the legal framework, and could lead to possible suggestions for 
policy development. Second, it could be constructive to research attitudes of political 
parties in connection to closure theory, to see how to further develop an inclusive 
policy that currently appears to be contradictory. Third, this study does not explicitly 
differ between highly skilled and low-skilled migrant workers or long-term 
employees and seasonal workers since the data did not explicitly give that much 
information to differ between the groups. They are legally subjected to the same 
conditions, but how does that look in practice? More in-depth research on various 
categories and variables in relation to closure theory, exploitation and 
(re)commodification is to ask for to map the strata of migrant workers in Sweden.  
5.3. Final remarks 
Labour migration is a growing global issue; labour migration is here to stay and the 
relevant question is not if people will come to Sweden to work, but how to treat them. 
Globally, the most sought-after group is the highly skilled migrant workers. Sweden 
is therefore an interesting case since we do include highly skilled and low-skilled 
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migrant workers on the same conditions. This is important and sends out signals that 
people are welcome here, not just highly skilled, but everyone. This indicates that 
Sweden is a progressive country. However, it could be argued that TCNs are allowed 
to come to Sweden to work due to reasons of competition between countries, not due 
to solidarity, and to be treated as equals on the labour market. Thus, to what extent is 
Sweden different from other countries? Labour exploitation and exclusion are 
unpleasant issues but it is clear from the present study that this happens in Sweden 
today. The concept of exploitation may be connected to commodification in the 
labour market: are migrant workers exploited, by the Swedish government, since they 
are subjected to restrictions? 
     The discussion competitive country versus cheap labour is also prevailing in 
Sweden. It is essential to investigate the consequences of the employer-driven policy 
since TCNs are exposed to various restrictions which are legitimized on the basis of 
their nationality. As in many other countries, seen in sections 1.1. and 1.2., the life 
situation for some migrant workers in Sweden may be characterised with 
vulnerability and lack of bargaining power. It is not my intention to reduce migrant 
workers to powerless and helpless victims without having a voice of their own. 
However, it appears that some of them are exposed to wrongful treatment in the 
labour market and that should be enough to be considered a problem requiring to be 
targeted. The data is not explicitly focused on that migrant workers currently should 
be subordinated Swedish workers. Still, since some migrant workers are assigned 
jobs that domestic workers are unwilling to take these persons are consequently 
perceived as inferior. The Swedish system might be characterised by openness 
compared to other countries. Yet, migrant workers are not employed on the same 
basis as Swedish workers, and it is a challenging thought to imagine a reality where 
they were. Instead of returning to the old system, more ways should be developed 
than those already in place for migrant workers to access essential information 
concerning their stay and some kind of operative and effective control mechanism 
should also be implemented. Even more measures than already taken are needed to 
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further decrease the risk of migrant workers being viewed as commodities ready for 
exploitation on the labour market. However, it can be asked if it is an obligation for 
the employer to inform the employee about everything connected to the Swedish 
labour market, or if it is up to the individual to actively search for that information. In 
the neo-liberal era cheap labour is sought-after and irresponsible employers will 
pursue this. They will always try to cheat the system. This does not necessarily 
denote that the legal framework is altogether weak, but policymakers should consider 
ways of how to empower migrant workers to be more in charge of their own lives. It 
is also not possible to know, from this study, to what extent the legal framework 
facilitates cheating. However, a greater challenge is how to be even more inclusive 
towards TCNs since that would imply to have the rights to fully entering the Swedish 
labour market.      
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6. Executive summary 
 
In 2008 the Swedish government and the Swedish Green party reformed the Swedish 
labour immigration law for third-country nationals, TCNs. The reform entailed a 
changed focus to an employer-driven policy, where no difference is made between 
high-skilled and low-skilled migrant workers. This implies a changed emphasize to 
an economic problem solving focus. Reasons behind the change in the legal 
framework were demographic challenges, revitalisation of the labour market, and an 
existing mismatch between labour demand and supply. Labour shortages and 
unemployment may occur concurrently. Moreover, it would make it easier for legal 
employment in Sweden and thus decrease work in the black market where employees 
tend to be most vulnerable.  
     Previous research indicates an existence of abuse of migrant workers in various 
contexts and countries. This knowledge guided this study with the intention to 
investigate if abuse also has infiltrated the Swedish labour market. It is important to 
investigate the practical side of the new system and examine the conditions for the 
migrant worker due to the vulnerable situation many migrant workers may 
experience. This study investigates how distinct actors in contact with labour 
migration perceive the changes in the legal framework and how the framework has 
influenced the conditions for TCNs migrant workers. The purpose of the study is to 
give an indication of possible consequential tendencies of the new legal framework.  
     The analytical framework consists of three theories: closure theory, exploitation, 
and (re)commodification. First, closure theory was selected due to the tendency for 
migrant workers to be excluded in society grounded in their status as temporary 
residents. Second, exclusion could lead to exploitation if migrant workers are in a 
vulnerable situation. Third, the dialectical form of commodification – 
decommodification – recommodification is connected to migrant workers being in 
Sweden for work, and work purposes only.  
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     This is a qualitative study including seven semi-structured interviews, and a 
discourse analysis on ten newspaper articles from two bigger Swedish newspapers. 
     The findings of the analysis show that there is a lack of comprehensive 
information on the legal framework in regards to migrant workers; this in turn may 
lead to migrants being extra-exploited on the Swedish labour market due to the 
various circumstances surrounding their situation in the country. In theory, the legal 
framework is designed for migrant workers to enjoy movement on the labour market, 
but they are at the same time supposed to be tied to the same occupation. Thus, they 
are not commodified enough for participation in the Swedish labour market. 
     In conclusion, Sweden might be on the way towards an inclusive immigration 
labour policy framework but there are problems within the current framework. This 
does not indicate that it should be better to return to the former legislation and 
increase the difficulty for migrant workers to enter Sweden. The challenge is how to 
include people in the labour market and for them to be treated equally as the Swedish 
workforce.  
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Appendix A. Interview guide (in Swedish and English) 
Uppvärmning 
1a. Skulle du kunna säga ditt namn och vilken organisation du arbetar för? 
1 b. Vilken position i organisationen innehar du? 
Tema 1. Arbetsplatsen 
1 a. Kan du berätta hur du och din organisation har kontakt med 
arbetskraftsinvandring? 
1 b. Vilka är dina uppgifter och ansvarsområden på arbetsplatsen när det gäller 
kontakt med arbetskraftsinvandring? 
2. Har du även haft kontakt med säsongsarbetskraftsinvandring och hur skiljer sig 
denna från annan arbetskraftsinvandring? 
3 a. Finns det något som fungerar särskilt bra när det gäller dina arbetsuppgifter där 
du har kontakt med arbetskraftsinvandrare?   
3 b. Vilka svårigheter känner du att du stöter på när det gäller dina arbetsuppgifter 
med arbetskraftsinvandrare? 
 
Tema 2. Nuvarande situation 
1 a. Vilka svagheter ser du med den nuvarande lagstiftningen? 
1 b. Vilka styrkor ser du med den nuvarande lagstiftningen? 
2. Det finns arbetslöshet i Sverige, hur kommer det sig, tror du, att arbetsgivare ändå 
anlitar arbetskraftsinvandrare? 
3 a. Vilka är fördelarna för arbetskraftsinvandrare att bli anställda i Sverige? 
3 b. Vilka är nackdelarna för arbetskraftsinvandrare att bli anställda i Sverige? 
3 b. Vilka är fördelarna för arbetsgivare att anställa arbetskraftsinvandrare? 
3 c. Vilka är nackdelarna för arbetsgivare att anställa arbetskraftsinvandrare? 
4. Har du någon fundering på hur man bättre skulle kunna samordna arbetsförslaget i 
hemlandet med arbetskontraktet här i Sverige?  
5. Vad anser du om tidsfristen på tre månader som den anställde har på sig för att 
hitta nytt jobb ifall en anställning skulle upphöra? 
6 a. Idag är den anställde kopplad till en viss arbetsgivare eller bransch de två första 
åren, och därefter till en viss bransch under ytterligare två år. Varför tror du att det 
bestämts? 
6 b. Vad anser du om detta? 
7 . Hur skulle du säga att användandet av arbetskraftsinvandrare påverkar den 
svenska arbetsstandarden och de svenska arbetsvillkoren? Har det någon effekt? 
8. En del anser att systemet med arbetskraftsinvandring och säsongsarbete globalt 
leder till att arbetskraft blir betraktat som vilken handelsvara som helst. Vad anser du 
om hur läget är i Sverige? 
9. I dagsläget finns det i Sverige en möjlighet att efter två års arbete få ytterligare två 
års förlängt arbetstillstånd. Därefter kan man bli erbjuden permanent 
uppehållstillstånd. Anser du att detta är ett bra tillvägagångssätt eller finns det något 
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som skulle kunna förbättras? 
10. För att bli folkbokförd som invandrare, och då kunna ta del av svenska 
välfärdssystemet, krävs att man stannar i Sverige minst tolv månader. Vad betyder 
detta för en person som är har säsongsarbetonad anställning? 
 
Tema 3. Kontrollmekanism 
1. Dagens lagtext framhäver vikten av lika arbetsvillkor för arbetsinvandrare som för 
de inhemska anställda, hur tycker du att detta fungerar i praktiken? 
2 a. Vilken sorts tillsyn över arbetsvillkoren och standarden finns i nuläget? 
2 b. Hur genomförs tillsynen? 
3 a. Hur blir arbetarna informerade om sina arbetsrättigheter? (tillgång till 
information)  
3 b. Vad anser du om detta? 
4 a. Om det uppstår problem mellan en anställd och arbetsgivare, hur tar man itu med 
det? 
4 b. Vad anser du om detta?  
5 a. Vad händer ifall en anställd klagar över sin arbetssituation?  
5 b. Till vem kan de vända sig med klagomål?  
5 c. Vilka är styrkorna och svagheterna med hur det fungerar för nuvarande? 
6. Hur skulle den anställde bäst kunna bli skyddad mot diskriminering och 
utnyttjande? 
 
Warming-up 
1 a. Could you state your name and what organisation you work for? 
1 b. What position in the organization do you have? 
 
Theme 1. The work place 
1 a. Could you tell me how you and your organization are in contact with labour 
migration? 
1 b. What are your tasks and areas of responsibilities when it comes to contact with 
labour migration? 
2. Have you also had contact with seasonal labour migration and how does that differ 
from other labour migration? 
3 a. Are there anything that works especially well when it comes to your work tasks 
when in contact with labour migration? 
3 b. What are the difficulties when it comes to your tasks with labour migration? 
 
Theme 2. Current situation 
1 a. What are the flaws, as you see it, with the current legal framework? 
1 b. What are the strengths, as you see it, with the current legal framework? 
2. There is unemployment in Sweden. How come, do you think, employers still hire 
labour migrants? 
3 a. What are the advantages for labour migrants to be employed in Sweden? 
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3 b. What are the disadvantages for labour migrants to be employed in Sweden? 
4. Have you any wonderings of how the offer of employment in the country of origin 
could be better coordinated with the employment contract in Sweden? 
5. What is your opinion about the timeframe of three months that the employee has 
for 
finding a new employment in case the first employment would cease? 
6 a. Currently the employee is bound to a certain employer or occupation during the 
first two years, and then to a certain occupation during further two years. Why is that 
so? 
6 b. What is your opinion about this? 
7. How would you say that labour migration affects the Swedish labour standard and 
the Swedish labour conditions? Does it have an effect? 
8. Some people thinks that the system with labour migration and seasonal labour 
globally leads to labour being seen upon as a commodity as any other. What is your 
opinion on this in Sweden? 
9. Currently there is in Sweden the possibility to, after two years of work, obtain 
additionally two years of work permit. Then a permanent residence permit may be 
offered. Do you think this is a good procedure or is there something that could be 
improved? 
10. To be nationally registered as an immigrant, and then take part of the Swedish 
welfare system, it is required to stay in Sweden at least twelve months. What does 
this mean for a person with a seasonally job? 
Theme 3. The control mechanism 
1. The current law highlights the importance of equal work conditions for labour 
migrants as well as for domestic workers, how do you feel that this is working in 
practice? 
2 a. What kind of supervision over the work conditions and the standard is there 
currently? 
2 b. How is the supervision carried out? 
3 a. How are the workers informed about their labour rights? (access to information?) 
3 b. What is your opinion about this? 
4 a. If a problem between the employee and the employer arises, how is it dealt with? 
4 b. What is your opinion about this? 
5 a. What happens if an employee complains about the working situation? 
5 b. To whom may they complain? 
5 c. What are the strengths and flaws with how it currently is functioning? 
6. How could the employee best be protected against discrimination and abuse? 
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Appendix B. List of interviewees. 
 
Ekenger, Karin. [The Confederation of Swedish Enterprises]. 24 April 2013. 
Stockholm. 
 
Firpo, Alejandro [Department for Migration and Asylum Policy, Ministry of Justice]. 
26 April 2013. Stockholm. 
 
Joseph, George. [Caritas]. Interview. 25 April 2013. Stockholm. 
 
Ingesson, Thord. [The Swedish Trade Union Confederation]. Interview. 25 April 
2013. Stockholm. 
 
Lindberg, Åsa. [The Swedish Migration Board]. 8 May 2013. Malmö. 
 
Olsson, Lars-Göran. [Kommunal, the Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union]. 18 April 
2013. Lund. 
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Appendix C. List of debate articles.  
 
Axén, Gunnar & Cederbratt, Mikael, 2013 ”Vi ska inte ha en utländsk och en svensk 
modell” Svenska Dagbladet. Brännpunkt 31-03-2013 
 
Bengtsson, Jenny & Ojanne, Katja, 2013 ”Folk nyttjas som slavar – med lagen som 
stöd” Aftonbladet 06-02-2013Hotel & Restaurant Union  
 
Ekenger, Karin & Fogelberg, Anders, 2012 ”Migrationsverket går för långt” Svenska 
Dagbladet.  Brännpunkt 25-01-2012  
 
Engblom, Samuel & Hallsten, Sonja, 2013 ”Vi måste agera mot de som inte följer 
reglerna” Svenska Dagbladet. Brännpunkt 7-02-2013  
 
Ferm, Maria, 2013 ”Så måste vi reglera arbetskraftsinvandringen” Aftonbladet. 
Debatt 14-02-2013  
 
Lindgren, Jonas, 2012 ”Vår satsning hindrar att människor far illa” Svenska 
Dagbladet. Brännpunkt 30-01-2012 SvD  
 
Lindholm, Johan; Niia, Ella; Lindgren, Lars; Sjöö, Per-Olof, Granlund, Lenita, 2013 
”Vi kräver schyssta villkor – även för migrantarbetarna” Aftonbladet 02-04-2013  
 
Månsson, Ola; Novák, Katarina; Östling Ollén, Eva; Ågren, Christer, 2013 ”Vi har en 
bra modell för arbetskraftsinvandring” Svenska Dagbladet. Brännpunkt 06-02-2013 
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Wagenius, Hanna; Pierini, Leo; Askeljung, Alfred, 2012 ”Facket får inte avgöra vem 
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